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THE SOUTH AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court dismantled one of the two pillars of the
Voting Rights Act: Section 5, which had barred southern jurisdictions from changing their
election laws without receiving prior federal approval. But the Court left standing the VRA’s
other pillar: Section 2, which prohibits racial discrimination in voting throughout the country.
The burning question in the wake of Shelby County is what will happen to minority
representation in the South now that Section 5 has been struck down but Section 2 lives on. This
Article is the first to address this vital issue.
The Article explores the Section 2 – Section 5 gap with respect to both the procedure and
the substance of voting rights litigation. Procedurally, the provisions differ in their allocation of
the burden of proof, their default before a decision on the merits is reached, and their
proceedings’  cost.    These  differences  mean  that  numerous  policies  that  previously  would  have  
been blocked now will go into effect. In the first substantive area to which the VRA applies, vote
dilution, the provisions diverge as well. Section 2 does not extend to bizarrely shaped districts
or districts whose minority populations are overly heterogeneous or below 50% in size. In
contrast, Section 5 applies to all of these district types. According to my empirical analysis,
more than one-third of all formerly protected districts in the South now may be eliminated with
legal impunity. In the other substantive area covered by the VRA, vote denial, the provisions
again vary in their scope. A mere statistical disparity between minorities and whites does not
violate Section 2, but it typically does suffice for preclearance to be denied. The rash of
franchise restrictions enacted by southern states in the months since Shelby County shows how
much this distinction matters.
The Article also considers some of the ways in which the Section 2 – Section 5 gap could
be closed. A new coverage formula could be adopted, thus restoring the prior regime. The
VRA’s  “bail  in”  provision  could  be  amended  to make it easier to subject jurisdictions to
preclearance through litigation. Or Section 2 could be revised so that it resembles the stricken
Section 5 more closely. Unfortunately, all of these steps face serious legal and political
obstacles. A divided Congress is unlikely to pass legislation touching on sensitive issues of race
and political power. Likewise, the Court may be reluctant to allow Shelby County to be
circumvented. The Section 2 – Section 5 gap thus will probably persist for the foreseeable
future.
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INTRODUCTION
For almost half a century, minority representation in America rested on two legal pillars.
The first, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), applies nationwide and prohibits practices
that  “result[]  in  a  denial  or  abridgement  of  the  right  .  .  .  to  vote on  account  of  race  or  color.”1 It is
a relatively conventional provision that creates a cause of action for plaintiffs who have been
subjected to racial vote dilution or denial. The second, Section 5 of the VRA, applies only to the
(mostly southern) jurisdictions specified in Section 4, and bans practices that have the purpose or
effect  of  “denying  or  abridging  the  right  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  color.”2 Despite its almost
identical language, Section 5 is a highly unusual provision that prevents covered jurisdictions
from implementing any changes to their voting laws unless they first have convinced the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or a federal court that the changes will not worsen the electoral
position of minority voters.3
On the penultimate day of the 2012-2013 term, the Supreme Court dismantled the second
of these two pillars. In Shelby County v Holder, the Court held that Section 4 of the VRA, which
contains the formula identifying the  jurisdictions  that  are  subject  to  Section  5’s  preclearance  
requirement, is unconstitutional.4 According to the Court, the Section 4 formula is both
obsolete—“based  on  decades-old  data  and  eradicated  practices”5—and irrational because
covered areas no longer perform worse than their non-covered peers along the formula’s  metrics  
1

42 USC § 1973(a).
Id § 1973c(a); see also id § 1973b(b) (specifying coverage formula of Section 4).
3
See id § 1973c(a).
4
Shelby Cty v Holder,133 S Ct 2612 (2013).
5
Id at 2627.
2
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of voter registration and turnout.6 Congress therefore exceeded its enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments when it reenacted Section 4 in 2006. Section 5 continues
to be good law, but it has been rendered a zombie provision, no longer applicable to any
jurisdiction, by the demise of Section 4.
An urgent question in the wake of Shelby County (and the subject of this Article) is what
will happen now to minority representation in the areas that formerly were covered by Section 5.
The question, in other words, is how large the gap is between Section 2, which continues to
apply nationwide, and Section 5. Is the gap quite small, in which case minority representation in
the South will be largely unaffected? Or is the gap more like a chasm, in which case the political
influence of minority groups will be sharply curtailed? The answer is crucial to determining the
electoral implications of Shelby County for the minorities  who  are  the  VRA’s  intended
beneficiaries. The answer also is highly relevant to whether and how Congress should respond to
the Court’s  neutering of Section 5.
Surprisingly, the existing literature has not explored in detail how Section 2 and Section 5
interrelate. Indeed, some scholars have elided the distinctions between the provisions and argued
that  they  both  can  be  “understood  to  require  the  creation  of  majority-minority districts whenever
possible.”7 When academics have explicitly addressed the space between Section 2 and Section
5, they have tended to conclude (without much elaboration) that it is not very large. For instance,
Samuel  Issacharoff  has  written  that,  in  the  absence  of  Section  5,  his  “suspicion is that the
combination of [S]ection 2, . . . the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact of
being in the process and at the table would afford much protection”  to  minority  groups.8 Justice
Kennedy expressed a similar sentiment at the Shelby County oral argument, declaring that “it’s  
not  clear  to  me  that  there’s that much difference [between] a Section 2 suit now and
preclearance.”9
In this Article, then, I carry out a conceptual, empirical, and political investigation of the
gap between Section 2 and Section 5. I analyze, that is, how the provisions differ in their formal
operation, what kinds (and quantities) of practices are permitted by Section 2 but barred by
Section 5, and which of these practices are likely to be enacted by the jurisdictions that now are
free from Section  5’s  constraints. My analysis covers both the procedural aspects of voting rights
litigation and the substance of minority representation. On the substantive side, I discuss both
vote dilution (redistricting in particular) and the recent wave of franchise restrictions that
6

See id at 2627-29.
Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U Chi L
Rev 553, 577 (2011); see also, for example, David  Epstein  and  Sharyn  O’Halloran,  A Strategic Dominance
Argument for Retaining Section 5 of the VRA, 5 Election L J 283, 285 (2006) (assuming that situations in which
Section 2 and Section 5 diverge substantively  are  “relatively  rare”).
8
Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum L Rev
1710, 1731 (2004); see also, for example, Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: The Complex Interaction Between Law and Politics, in David L. Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the
Voting Rights Act 311, 321 (Russell 2006); Michael J. Pitts, Let’s  Not  Call  the  Whole  Thing  Off  Just  Yet:  A  
Response  to  Samuel  Issacharoff’s  Suggestion  to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 Neb L Rev 605, 627
(2005)  (“[T]he gap has been significantly narrowed between what amounts to a section 2 violation and what
amounts  to  a  section  5  violation.”).
9
Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96), *37.
7
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scholars  have  dubbed  the  “new  vote  denial.”10 Throughout my examination, I consider the
statutory text, the case law, and the empirical evidence as  they  stood  at  the  time  of  this  Article’s  
writing. Section 2 and Section 5 operated quite differently in earlier periods, and how they will
evolve in the future is, of course, unknowable.
With respect to procedure, there are three key differences between litigation under
Section 2 and preclearance under Section 5. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff under Section
2 but on the jurisdiction under Section 5. The default is that a challenged policy goes into effect
under Section 2 but that it does not under Section 5. And the party that typically invokes the
VRA’s  protections  is  a  private  plaintiff under Section 2 but the DOJ under Section 5. These
differences mean that certain policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5 now
will be implemented. Sometimes a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy its burden under Section 2
even though, on the same facts, a jurisdiction would have been unable to meet its burden under
Section 5. Sometimes a plaintiff will be able to satisfy its Section 2 burden, but only after a
contested policy has come into force for some time. And sometimes private parties will want to
challenge particular electoral practices, but will be unable to do so because of limited resources.
How many policies will take effect as a consequence of these procedural distinctions? It
is impossible to know for certain, but the available empirical evidence suggests that the number
will be substantial. First, the success rate of Section 2 litigation in areas formerly covered by
Section 5 has hovered around 40 percent over the last generation.11 Plaintiffs therefore are likely
to lose many of their lawsuits against practices that previously would have been denied
preclearance. Second, the proportion of Section 2 suits in which preliminary injunctions are
granted is quite small, certainly no higher than 25 percent and probably lower than 5 percent.12
Many policies thus are likely to go into effect temporarily even if they ultimately are invalidated
in Section 2 litigation. And third, the volume of Section 5 preclearance denials has been about
the same, over the past few decades, as the volume of Section 2 suits in covered areas.13
Accordingly, private parties would need a significant infusion of resources in order to dispute all
of the policies that formerly would have been blocked.
Turning next to vote dilution, there also are three major differences between the electoral
districts to which Section 2 applies and those protected by Section 5. Section 2 does not extend
to bizarrely shaped districts while Section 5 does. Section 2 does not encompass districts that
merge highly dissimilar minority communities while Section 5 again does. And Section 2 does
not cover districts whose minority voters comprise less than 50 percent of their total population
while Section 5 does once more. These differences stem from a series of Supreme Court
decisions narrowing the scope of Section 2, and they mean that certain districts that previously
were shielded by Section 5 now no longer will enjoy legal protection. Jurisdictions now will
10

See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 SC
L Rev 689 (2006) (coining the phrase).
11
See Ellen Katz et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U Mich J L Reform 643, 656 (2006).
12
See J. Gerald Hebert and Armand Defner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama and the
Supreme Court, Campaign Legal Center Blog (Mar 1, 2013), online at
http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=506:more-observations-on-shelbycounty-alabama-and-the-supreme-court-.
13
See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013).
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have the ability to eliminate districts that are shaped too strangely, that have overly
heterogeneous minority populations, or that have minority populations that are too small, to
qualify for Section 2 coverage.
How many districts fall into these categories? To answer this question, I first identified
all of the districts that used to be protected by Section 5 in the nine southern and southwestern
states to which the provision formerly applied in large part or in full.14 There are 404
congressional and state legislative districts that meet these criteria. Of these, twenty-two are so
non-compact that they likely can be dismantled without violating Section 2. This number is small
because jurisdictions seem to have learned from the redistricting battles of the 1990s, when the
Court struck down several strangely shaped districts. But a much larger number of districts, 146
in total, contain minority populations that are so heterogeneous that Section 2 may not extend to
them. The role of such heterogeneity in Section 2 doctrine is not yet settled, but if it is a binding
requirement then minority representation in the South could be slashed in the wake of Shelby
County. Lastly, only 17 previously covered districts have minority voter proportions below 50
percent. Here too jurisdictions appear to have taken to heart the lessons of earlier Court
decisions—and also to have mastered the art of crafting majority-minority districts while
simultaneously advancing partisan interests.
Of course, not all of the districts that populate the Section 2 – Section 5 gap will be
disbanded. When Republicans are responsible for redistricting (as they now are in almost every
formerly covered state), they often will find it politically beneficial to preserve majority-minority
districts. Such districts enable them to pack Democrats into a small number of overwhelmingly
safe constituencies, thus enhancing Republican electoral prospects. Likewise, when Democrats
are in charge, they often will face intense pressure from minority groups not to eliminate
minority-controlled districts, even if doing so would help the Democratic cause. But this is not to
say that the Section 2 – Section 5 gap will not be exploited at all. Republican line-drawers
sometimes will be able to reap greater political benefits by concentrating minority voters into a
smaller number of super-packed districts. Analogously, Democratic line-drawers sometimes will
decide to craft more districts in which minority voters are sufficiently numerous to ensure the
victory of a Democrat—but not to elect their own preferred candidate.
Finally, the differences between Section 2 and Section 5 are more uncertain in the vote
denial context. The franchise restrictions recently enacted by many states are a relatively new
development, and neither the courts nor the DOJ yet have had time to develop concrete
standards. Still, it again appears that there is substantive space between the two provisions.
Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to demonstrate not only that a statistical disparity exists
between minorities and whites, but also that a franchise restriction interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause the disparity. Under Section 5, on the other hand, a disparate
impact alone usually suffices to prevent a restriction from going into effect, as long as the burden
imposed by the restriction on voting is material.
Because of the small number of cases to which these standards have been applied, the
magnitude of the relevant Section 2 – Section 5 gap is unclear. But it is revealing that plaintiffs
14

These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia.
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have yet to prevail in a Section 2 challenge to a photo identification law, while three such laws
were blocked, at least temporarily, under Section 5.15 Similarly, a recent Florida law that reduced
the  number  of  hours  for  early  voting  was  denied  preclearance  with  respect  to  the  state’s  five  
formerly covered counties, but sustained under Section 2 with respect to the rest of the state.16 If
there indeed is space between Section 2 and Section 5 in the vote denial context, there is little
doubt that it quickly will be seized. Unlike in the redistricting context, Republicans’  political
incentives point unambiguously toward the enactment of additional franchise restrictions. Not
surprisingly, in the brief period that has elapsed since Shelby County was decided, officials in
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia already have announced their
intention to pass or implement photo ID laws and other similar measures.17
Assume, then, that there is both a procedural and a substantive gap between Section 2 and
Section 5. Assume, that is, that minority representation in the South in fact will be adversely
affected by the nullification of Section 5. What are the implications for Congress and for the
Court? If these institutions are unconcerned about minority political influence, of course, the
only upshot is that the new status quo should be maintained. If the institutions are concerned,
however, there exist several options for narrowing the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. First, as the
Court observed in Shelby County,  “Congress  may  draft  another  formula  based  on  current  
conditions.”18 Metrics such as the success rate of Section 2 litigation, the prevalence of racially
polarized voting, and the persistence of racially discriminatory attitudes all would result in most
of the formerly covered areas once again becoming subject to preclearance. Second, Congress
could amend Section 3 of the VRA19 to  make  it  easier  to  “bail  in”  jurisdictions  that  have  
committed voting rights violations. Section 3 applies at present only if a constitutional
transgression has occurred; it could be revised to extend to findings of Section 2 liability as well.
Last, and most relevant to this Article, Congress could amend Section 2 to make it more
closely resemble the stricken Section 5. On the procedural side, Congress could increase the
availability of preliminary injunctions and institute a burden-shifting framework under which the
onus would switch to the jurisdiction once a plaintiff makes a preliminary showing of harm.
With respect to vote dilution, Congress  could  expand  the  scope  of  Section  2’s  coverage  so  that  it  
too applies to districts that are strangely shaped or whose minority populations are heterogeneous
or below 50 percent in size. And with respect to vote denial, Congress could make disparate
impact alone the standard for Section 2 liability. Moreover, at least on the substantive side, these
changes also could be made by the Court. It is the Court that has exercised its interpretive
discretion to limit Section 2 in the past. This same discretion could be used to broaden it in the
future.
The Article proceeds as follows. The first three Parts explore the contours of the Section
2 – Section 5 gap in the contexts of procedure, vote dilution, and vote denial. All three include
conceptual and empirical assessments of the gap, while the latter two also evaluate the extent to
15

These were a Louisiana law in 1994, a South Carolina law in 2012, and a Texas law in 2012.
Compare Florida v United States, 885 F Supp 2d 299 (DDC 2012) (denying preclearance in five covered
counties) with Brown v Detzner, 895 F Supp 2d 1236 (MD Fla 2012) (upholding law statewide under Section 2).
17
See Lizette Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Efforts to Police Voters, NY Times A1 (Aug 7, 2013);
Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, NY Times A9 (July 6, 2013).
18
Shelby Cty. v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013).
19
42 USC § 1973a(c).
16
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which the gap is likely to be exploited by political actors. The final Part shifts from analysis to
prescription. It presents a range of actions that Congress and the Court could take to undo the
effects of Shelby County—to make Section Two minus Section Five once again equal to zero.
I. PROCEDURE
Beginning with procedure, then, the crucial difference between Section 2 and Section 5 is
that the former authorizes a conventional cause of action while the latter establishes the
extraordinary institution of preclearance. In this Part I probe the implications of this distinction,
focusing on the kind and quantity of policies that formerly would have been blocked but that
now will go into effect. I first explain, as a conceptual matter, why there are likely to be policies
that fall into the procedural gap between the provisions. Some previously blocked policies now
will not be challenged; some will be challenged but will be upheld; and some will be struck
down but only after they temporarily have come into force. I then survey the available empirical
evidence about the magnitude of the procedural gap. Some rough estimates are that private
parties would require at least twice their current resources to challenge all of the previously
blocked policies; that 60 percent of policies that are challenged will be upheld; and that 95
percent of policies that eventually are stricken still will go into effect temporarily. These figures
must be taken with a grain of salt, but they suggest that the impact of switching from Section 5
preclearance to Section 2 litigation will be substantial.
A. Conceptual Differences
In its current form, Section 2 creates a cause of action for parties who believe that an
electoral  practice  “results  in  a  denial  or  abridgement  of  the  right  .  .  .  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  
color.”20 The  provision  is  violated  “if,  based  on  the  totality  of  circumstances,  it  is  shown  that”  
members  of  a  protected  racial  or  ethnic  group  “have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate  to  participate  in  the  political  process  and  to  elect  representatives  of  their  choice.”21 In
contrast, Section 5 bars covered jurisdictions from implementing any changes to their voting
laws until the changes have been approved by either the DOJ or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.22 The DOJ has sixty days to object to a submission, while a three-judge
panel of the federal court is convened if a jurisdiction chooses the judicial route for
preclearance.23 Under both the administrative and judicial routes, a jurisdiction must establish
that  its  amendment  “neither  has  the  purpose  nor  will  have  the  effect  of  denying  or  abridging  the  
right to vote on account of race or color.”24 “Any  discriminatory  purpose”  is  prohibited  by  this  
language,25 as  is  “diminishing  the  ability”  of  members  of  protected  groups  “to  elect  their  
preferred  candidates  of  choice.”26
20

Id § 1973(a).
Id § 1973(b). According to the statute, minority groups’  diminished  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  
political  process  and  to  elect  the  representatives  of  their  choice  is  evidence  that  “the  political  processes  leading  to  
nomination  or  election  .  .  .  are  not  equally  open  to  participation”  by  the  groups’  members. Id.
22
See id § 1973c(a).
23
See id.
24
Id.
25
Id § 1973c(c).
26
Id § 1973c(b); see also id §  1973c(d)  (“The  purpose  of  subsection  (b)  of  this  section  is  to  protect  the  
ability  of  such  citizens  to  elect  their  preferred  candidates  of  choice.”).
21
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The first important difference between Section 2 litigation and Section 5 preclearance is
the allocation of the burden of proof. Under Section 2—as under most causes of action—“the  
initial  burden  of  proving  [a  policy’s]  invalidity [is]  squarely  on  the  plaintiff’s  shoulders.”27 If the
plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden, with respect to each statutory element, then the challenged
policy comes into (or remains in) force. Under  Section  5,  on  the  other  hand,  “a  jurisdiction  
seeking . . . preclearance must prove that the change is nondiscriminatory in purpose and
effect.”28 If the jurisdiction cannot meet its burden, as to both purpose and effect, then its
proposed policy cannot be implemented.
Sometimes the allocation of the burden is immaterial. When the illegality of a policy is
sufficiently clear, a plaintiff can satisfy its burden under Section 2 and a jurisdiction cannot meet
its burden under Section 5. Likewise, when the lawfulness of a policy is evident enough, a
plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden under Section 2 and a jurisdiction can meet its burden under
Section 5. But sometimes the allocation of the burden is dispositive. There necessarily exist
circumstances in which a plaintiff is unable to satisfy its burden under Section 2 and, on the same
facts, a jurisdiction is unable to meet its burden under Section 5. In these close cases, a policy
takes effect if it is the subject of Section 2 litigation, but is blocked if it is the subject of Section 5
preclearance.29
A second procedural difference between Section 2 and Section 5 is that, under the former,
a policy typically remains in force while it is being challenged, while under the latter, a policy
never goes into effect until it has been precleared.30 The provisions have opposite defaults, in
other words, during the period before a decision on the merits has been reached. This distinction
means that, under Section 2, a policy that eventually is declared unlawful still may be
implemented for one or more election cycles, causing harm to minorities in the meantime.31
Under Section 5, in contrast, a policy that is denied preclearance never may be put into
operation, not even for a single election.
However, this difference between the provisions dissolves whenever a Section 2 plaintiff
manages to secure a preliminary injunction. In this case, as in a preclearance proceeding, a policy
does not go into effect until it explicitly has been deemed lawful. Of course, preliminary
injunctive relief is not easy to obtain, requiring, at an early stage of the litigation, a judicial

27
Voinovich v Quilter, 507 US 146, 155 (1993); see also 42  USC  §  1973(b)  (provision  violated  only  “if  .  .  .  
it is shown”  that  substantive  standards  have  been  satisfied  (emphasis  added));;  S Rep No 97-417, at 27 (1982).
28
Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 263 (2003); see also Georgia v United States, 411 US 526, 538 (1973);
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended [hereinafter DOJ
Procedures], 28 CFR §  51.52(a)  (“The burden of proof is on a submitting authority .  .  .  .”).
29
See Epstein  and  O’Halloran,  5 Election L J at 284-85 (cited in note 7) (observing that there exist
“proposals  whose  effects  are  unclear,  so  that  they  would  be  struck  down  under  Section  5,  but  survive  under  Section  
2”).
30
See 42  USC  §  1973c(a)  (“[U]nless  and  until  [preclearance  is  granted]  no  person  shall  be  denied  the  right  
to  vote  for  failure  to  comply  with  such  qualification,  prerequisite,  standard,  practice,  or  procedure.”).
31
See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013)  (“[D]uring the
time it takes to litigate a section 2 action . . . proponents of a discriminatory law may enjoy its benefits, potentially
winning elections and gaining the advantage of incumbency before the law is overturned.”).
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finding that  a  plaintiff’s  claim  is  likely  to  succeed.32 But it is an available remedy, and when it is
granted, Section 2 and Section 5 partially converge.
The final procedural differences between the provisions relate to the magnitude and
allocation of the proceedings’ costs.33 Litigation under Section 2 is more expensive than
administrative preclearance under Section 5. Section 2 plaintiffs must go through some or all of a
lawsuit’s  familiar  phases—discovery, summary judgment, trial, appeal, etc.—while jurisdictions
covered by Section 5 need only submit a standardized set of forms to the DOJ.34 Moreover,
private parties are the usual plaintiffs in Section 2 litigation, while the DOJ is the key institution
involved in Section 5 preclearance.35 Private parties thus incur much of the cost of litigation
under Section 2, while the DOJ shoulders much of the expense of preclearance under Section 5.
The upshot of these differences is that  a  proceeding’s  cost  rises  when  it  takes place under
Section 2 rather than Section 5, and a larger proportion of this higher cost is borne by private
parties. Now that preclearance is unavailable, then, private parties would require additional
resources in order to challenge under Section 2 all of the policies that formerly would have been
blocked under Section 5. If these resources are not forthcoming, then private parties will not be
able to contest the full set of policies that previously would have been denied approval. They will
need to pick and choose their battles, letting slide some number of policies that they believe (and
the DOJ would have agreed) are discriminatory.
But some caveats must be appended to this analysis. First, administrative preclearance
may be inexpensive, but judicial preclearance, which a covered jurisdiction always has the
option to request,36 is not. Full-dress litigation under Section 5 is similar in scope and complexity
to a lawsuit under Section 2. Second, while private parties are the most common plaintiffs in
Section 2 actions, the DOJ also has the authority to bring suit (and to intervene in existing suits)
under the provision.37 Now that the DOJ no longer can block policies using Section 5, it can be
expected to shift some of its resources to litigating Section 2 claims. Third, while the DOJ
always was the indispensable institution under Section 5, private parties played an important role
in preclearance proceedings as well. They commonly advised the DOJ in the administrative
context and intervened in suits in the judicial context—both costs that no longer will be incurred
after Shelby County. Lastly, private parties are entitled to the reimbursement of attorney and
expert fees when they prevail in Section 2 suits.38 Thus, in successful cases, the ultimate cost of
such suits is not necessarily exorbitant (at least not to the plaintiffs).
32
See Winter v NRDC, Inc, 555 US 7, 20 (2008). To issue a preliminary injunction, a court also must find
that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief, that the balance of equities is in the
plaintiff’s  favor,  and that an injunction is in the public interest. See id.
33
One additional procedural difference is that Section 5 requires jurisdictions to notify the DOJ of each
electoral change that they wish to make. Section 2 has no comparable disclosure requirement, meaning that
sometimes private parties will not know about a policy that they would have challenged had they learned about it.
34
See DOJ Procedures, 28 CFR §§ 5120-28 (detailing procedures for preclearance submission as well as
requisite content).
35
Of course, the jurisdictions whose policies are at issue are the same in either proceeding.
36
See 42 USC § 1973c(a).
37
See, for example, United States v Blaine Cty, 363 F3d 897 (9th Cir 2004) (Section 2 action brought by
DOJ); Brown v Bd of  School  Comm’rs, 706 F2d 1103 (11th Cir 1983) (Section 2 action in which DOJ intervened).
38
See 42 USC § 1973l(e).

8

One more caveat should be mentioned with respect to this entire Part. In discussing the
procedural differences between Section 2 and Section 5, I implicitly am controlling for their
differences in substance. Their substantive distinctions are addressed at length in the following
two Parts, but here I am interested in investigating whether (and how large) a space exists
between the provisions even if Section 2 vote dilution or denial is identical to Section 5
retrogression. Having identified the conceptual contrasts between the two kinds of proceedings,
then, I turn next to the empirical evidence about the magnitude of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.
B. Empirical Gap
The empirical evidence, it must be conceded at the outset, is quite limited. Section 5 was
in force alongside Section 2 until Shelby County was decided, so it is difficult to determine from
historical data how many policies that were blocked by Section 5 would have gone into effect
had only Section 2 been available to challenge them. The deterrent effect of Section 5—how
many policies never were proposed at all because  of  the  provision’s  existence—is even harder to
quantify. Still, a wealth of information exists about the operation of Section 2 and Section 5 over
the years, and it is possible to draw several inferences from this material about the size of the gap
between the provisions. It also is possible to reach some tentative conclusions from the
experiences of jurisdictions that were bailed in under Section 3 but that later were released from
their preclearance obligations.
To begin with, a study by Ellen Katz found (and other studies later confirmed) that the
success rate of Section 2 lawsuits in formerly covered jurisdictions was approximately 40
percent between 1982 and 2005.39 This figure suggests that when private parties challenge
policies that in the past would have been blocked by Section 5, they will lose a good deal of the
time. The figure suggests, in other words, that Section  2’s  allocation  of  the  burden  to  the  plaintiff  
rather than the jurisdiction will be dispositive in a substantial number of cases. Of course, the
policies that in the past would have been blocked by Section 5 may differ in important respects
from the policies that were analyzed in the retrospective Section 2 studies. In particular, the
former policies may be more clearly discriminatory than the latter, in which case the success rate
for plaintiffs challenging the former may be higher than 40 percent. Still, it seems unlikely that
this figure will approach 100 percent, meaning that Section  2’s  burden  allocation  will  be  decisive  
with some frequency.40

39
See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 875 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (citing 40.5
percent figure); Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L Rev 1, 54 appendix
1 (2008) (citing 39.4 percent figure); Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11) (citing 42.5 percent
figure). The success rate was slightly higher, 45.9 percent, for challenges to changes in electoral practices—which
are, of course, the only policies that can be blocked by Section 5. See Ellen Katz, Not Like the South? Regional
Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in Asa Henderson, ed, Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power 183, 221 table 8.6 (Berkeley 2007)
[hereinafter VRA Reauthorization]. The success rate also has been declining over time. See Cox and Miles, 108
Colum L Rev at 5, 14 (cited in note 39); Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11). And the success
rate in non-covered jurisdictions, 32.2 percent, was lower than in covered jurisdictions despite the unavailability of
Section 5 in the former areas. See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11).
40
An additional caveat is that the 40 percent figure stems from Section 2 suits that gave rise to published
decisions. See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 652 (cited in note 11). I am not aware of any data on the success
rate of Section 2 suits that did not generate published decisions. However, former DOJ voting rights attorney (and
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Next, estimates vary as to how often preliminary injunctions are granted in Section 2
cases, but consistently are quite low. At the Shelby County oral argument, Solicitor General
Donald Verrilli  stated  that  such  relief  is  obtained  in  “fewer  than  one-quarter of ultimately
successful  Section  2  suits.”41 Veteran Section 2 litigators Armand Defner and Gerry Hebert put
the  proportion  at  “less  than  5%,  and  possibly  quite  lower.”42 And former DOJ official Robert
Kengle  recently  testified  that  “the total number of such cases since 1982 is in the range of 10 to
15.”43 Whatever the exact figure may be, the implication is that preliminary injunctions rarely
alter the Section 2 default during the period before a decision on the merits is reached. Most of
the time, policies that never previously would have gone into effect due to Section 5 now will
come into force upon enactment—even if they ultimately are struck down. The nominal
availability of preliminary relief does not appreciably shrink the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.44
Nor is the gap mitigated by the pace of Section 2 litigation. According to testimony by
longtime  civil  rights  attorney  Anita  Earls,  it  takes  “at  least  two  years”  to  advance  a  Section  2  
action from  filing  to  trial,  and  “[t]wo  to  five  years  is  a  rough  average”  of a  suit’s  duration.45 This
period typically is long enough to encompass at least one and possibly multiple election cycles. It
indicates that the absence of preliminary relief in most Section 2 cases will have real bite.
Litigation will not move quickly enough to produce a decision on the merits before a policy that
eventually is invalidated has harmed minorities for an election or two (and allowed incumbents
to entrench themselves in office).46
Of course, the burden of proof and the availability of preliminary relief matter only if
Section 2 litigation actually has commenced. But such litigation may not commence if private
parties lack the resources to challenge policies that formerly would have been denied
preclearance. Defner and Hebert have estimated that  a  Section  2  districting  case  “requires a

current law professor) Michael Pitts informs me that the latter rate almost certainly is higher because it would
include the many consent decrees approved as a result of Section 2 litigation.
41
Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96), *38.
42
Hebert and Defner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court (cited in note
12).
43
Testimony of Robert A. Kengle Before the House Judiciary Committee 11 (July 18, 2013) (emphasis
added). The reasons why preliminary relief rarely is granted in Section 2 cases include the difficulty of amassing
sufficient evidence at an early stage in the litigation, see Testimony of Prof Justin Levitt Before the US Senate
Committee on the Judiciary 8 (July 17, 2013) [hereinafter Levitt Testimony], and the aversion of many courts to
enjoining elections if alternate remedies can be imposed in the future, see, for example, Williams v Dallas, 734 F
Supp 1317, 1367 (ND Tex 1990).
44
Though it should be noted again that the policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5
may differ materially from the policies that until now have given rise to Section 2 litigation. It is possible that
preliminary injunctions will be granted with greater frequency when the former policies are challenged under
Section 2.
45
Testimony of Anita Earls Before the House Judiciary Committee 63-64 (Oct 25, 2005); see also Brief of
Joaquin Avila et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 22, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96)
[hereinafter Avila Brief].
46
It may be the case, as Michael Carvin has testified, that Section 2 and Section 5 give rise to equally
lengthy litigation in complicated redistricting cases. See Testimony of Michael A. Carvin Before the US Senate
Committee on the Judiciary 7 (July 17, 2013). But during the pendency of the litigation, the district plan typically
goes into effect under Section 2 but does not under Section 5.
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minimum of hundreds of thousands of dollars,”47 while  Hebert  separately  has  testified  that  “the
cost . . . to bring a vote dilution case through trial and appeal[] runs close to a half a million
dollars.”48 Similarly, in a 2005 study, the Federal Judicial Center found that voting rights suits
entail 3.86 times more work than the median federal action, and rank sixth in intensity out of
sixty-three case categories.49 The unusual cost and complexity of Section 2 suits mean that
private parties will not be able to bring them against all of the policies that previously were
blocked by Section 5. As  a  group  of  Section  2  litigators  has  written,  “The voting rights bar lacks
the numbers and resources . . . to prosecute the . . . Section 2 lawsuits that would be necessary to
block all the discriminatory changes that would be implemented without Section 5.”50
What resources would the voting rights bar need to pursue all of these cases? One way to
answer this question (albeit imprecisely) is to compare the volume of Section 2 and Section 5
activity in recent years. Under Section 2, then, there were 653 successful suits51 in formerly
covered jurisdictions between 1982 and 2005, resulting in 160 published decisions.52 The total
number of such suits is unknown, but has been estimated conservatively to be at least 800.53
Under Section 5, over the same period, there were 626 preclearance denials by the DOJ and 25
preclearance denials by the courts.54 Another 800 proposed policies were withdrawn or modified
after the DOJ requested additional information about them.55 Accordingly, the ratio of Section 2
to Section 5 activity in the South was between 1:1 and 1:2 over the last generation. Private
parties would have had to have launched double to triple their actual number of Section 2 suits in
order to have challenged all of the policies that were blocked by Section 5. This larger volume of

47

J. Gerald Hebert and Armand Defner, Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court, Campaign Legal
Center Blog (Feb 28, 2013), online at
http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=505:shelby-county-alabama-and-thesupreme-court.
48
Avila Brief at 25 (cited in note 45); see also Levitt Testimony at 9 (cited in note 43) (reporting  plaintiffs’  
fees and costs of $712,027.71 in a representative Section 2 case). In contrast, administrative preclearance usually
costs between $1,000 and $5,000 for a major change, and between $500 and $1,000 for a minor one. See Avila Brief
at 26 (cited in note 45); see also National Committee on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The
Voting Rights Act at Work 1982-2005, at 55-56 (2006) [hereinafter Protecting Minority Voters] (noting much greater
cost of Section 2 suit challenging at-large voting scheme for Charleston county council than Section 5 preclearance
denial of identical policy proposal by Charleston county school board).
49
Fed Judicial Ctr, 2003-2004 District Court Case-Weighting Study 5-6 table 1 (2005); see also Shelby Cty
v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (citing this study); United States v Blaine
Cty,  363  F3d  897,  906  (9th  Cir  2004)  (“[S]ection  2  cases  are  some  of  the  most  difficult  to  litigate  .  .  .  .”).
50
Avila Brief at 3 (cited in note 45); see also id at 29 (noting that major civil rights groups such as the
NAACP  and  the  Lawyers’  Committee  for  Civil  Rights  have  only  a  handful  of  attorneys  dedicated  to  voting  rights).
51
See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 868, 872; Protecting Minority Voters at 88 (cited in note 48).
52
See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11).
53
See id at 655. A single group, the ACLU Voting Rights Project, brought several hundred of these actions.
See ACLU, The Case for Extending and Amending the Voting Rights Act 4 (2006).
54
See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 866, 870-72; see also Luis Ricardo Fraga and Maria Lizet Ocampo, More
Information Requests and the Deterrent Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Henderson, ed, VRA
Reauthorization 47, 49 (cited in note 39) (finding that DOJ preclearance denials prevented 2,282 individual changes
from taking effect).
55
See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 866, 872; Fraga and Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act at 58 table 3.1 (cited in note 54) (identifying 854 such policies).
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litigation would have required double to triple the resources as well (assuming that the
hypothetical suits would have been similar in cost to the actual suits).56
But recall from the above discussion that the DOJ also will be able to shoulder some of
the heavier Section 2 burden in the wake of Shelby County.57 Unfortunately,  the  DOJ’s  capacity  
to bring Section 2 suits is relatively limited. Its Voting Rights Section includes a range of
demographers, historians, and other analysts who formerly worked on Section 5 matters—but
“comparatively  few  attorneys”  who  now  could  turn  their attention to Section 2.58 Notably, the
Section filed only eighteen Section 2 cases during the eight years of the Bush administration, and
has initiated just four cases under the Obama administration (through 2012).59 These numbers
undoubtedly will rise as the Section shifts its focus from Section 5 to Section 2, but, as Justin
Levitt  has  observed,  “‘The  Nation’s  Litigator’ should not be expected to meet all of the new need
. . . at least given staffing at the current order of magnitude.”60
Since the DOJ will be unable to play the role of deus ex machina, private parties will
need to make difficult choices as to which policies they will challenge (barring a large infusion
of resources). The policies they seem least apt to contest are ones promulgated by local
governments. In recent years, local practices accounted for more than 90 percent of preclearance
denials under Section 5,61 but only about 70 percent of Section 2 litigation.62 Suits against local
governments also are especially vulnerable to “[t]he unavailability of experienced voting rights
attorneys and of sufficient financial resources,”  according  to  longtime  Section  2  litigators.63
High-profile statewide laws, such as district plans and franchise restrictions, thus are likely to be
the target of future Section 2 litigation. The Section 2 – Section 5 gap probably will be largest
with respect to less salient local election law changes.
The final evidence about the size of the gap stems from the experiences of the two states,
Arkansas and New Mexico, that have been bailed in under Section 3 of the VRA. Section 3
authorizes  courts  to  impose  a  preclearance  requirement  almost  identical  to  Section  5’s  on
56
If Section 5 had a significant deterrent effect in the past, then jurisdictions now may be expected to enact
more policies that formerly would have been denied preclearance. In this case, private parties would need even more
resources to challenge under Section 2 all of the policies that previously would have been blocked. In terms of actual
dollar figures, there were approximately sixty policies per year that were blocked by Section 5 over the 1982-2005
period. If each of these policies would have cost about $500,000 to litigate under Section 2, then the total price tag
for challenging the policies under Section 2 rather than under Section 5 would have been roughly $30 million per
year.
57
See note 37 and accompanying text.
58
Levitt Testimony at 11 (cited in note 43); see also Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the
Operations of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division 9 (2013) [hereinafter Inspector General Report] (noting
that number of attorneys in Voting Section has varied between thirty-one and forty-five in recent years).
59
See Inspector General Report at 24 (cited in note 58). Former DOJ voting rights attorney John Tanner
also informs me that since 1976 the DOJ has launched only 112 Section 2 cases, or approximately three per year.
60
Levitt Testimony at 11.
61
See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013); Pitts, 84 Neb L
Revat 612-13 (cited in note 8).
62
See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 54 appendix 1 (cited in note 39); Pitts, 84 Neb L Rev at 616
(cited  in  note  8)  (“[S]ection  2  cases are much less likely to be filed when it comes to redistricting in smaller
jurisdictions  .  .  .  .”).
63
Avila Brief at 28 (cited in note 45); see also Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 872 (noting that difficulty of bringing
Section  2  claim  is  greatest  “at  the  local  level  and  in  rural  communities”).
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jurisdictions that are found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.64 The
provision has been used only twice to bail in states, both times for the 1990 redistricting cycle.65
In both Arkansas and New Mexico, then, the Section 2 litigation in the 1980s that led to the
imposition of preclearance was much costlier and lengthier than the proceedings in the following
decade. In Arkansas, the Jeffers suit in the 1980s necessitated a trial66 and resulted in the creation
of eight new majority-minority districts,67 while  the  state’s  district plans in the 1990s were
precleared by the court with relatively little fuss.68 Analogously, in New Mexico, the Sanchez
suit in the 1980s led to sixteen districts being invalidated, primary elections being nullified, and
federal examiners being deployed,69 while  the  state’s  plans in the 1990s were precleared by the
DOJ within four months.70 This history confirms the much greater expense and complexity of
Section 2 litigation relative to preclearance.71
Arkansas’s  experiences since the 1990 redistricting cycle—i.e., after it was released from
its preclearance obligations—also are illuminating. None  of  the  state’s  district  plans  in  the  2000s  
was challenged under Section 2, suggesting either that private parties lacked the resources to
dispute them or that they were compliant with the VRA.72 In the 2010s, private parties did bring
a  Section  2  action  against  Arkansas’s  state  senate  plan,  alleging  that  one  of  its  districts  was  “not  
an effective majority-minority  district.”73 The court rejected this claim even though it seemed to
concede  that  the  district  did  not  “provide  minority  voters  .  .  .  with  the  ability  to  elect  candidates  
of  their  choice.”74 The court rejected the claim, that is, while apparently admitting that the state
senate plan was retrogressive and thus would have violated Section 5. Also of note, private
parties  did  not  challenge  Arkansas’s  2010s state house plan even though it reduced by one the
number of majority-minority districts.75 This plan likely would have been denied preclearance
too, but it escaped  judicial  review  altogether  thanks  to  the  expiration  of  the  state’s  Section  3  
coverage.
64

See 42 USC § 1973a(c).
See Jeffers v Clinton, 740 F Supp 585, 601-02 (ED Ark. 1990) (invoking Section 3 for preclearance of
majority-vote  provisions  and  court’s  own  equitable  power  for  preclearance  of  district  plans);;  Sanchez v Anaya, No
82-0067M (DNM Dec 17, 1984) (consent decree).
66
See Jeffers v Clinton, 730 F Supp 196 (ED Ark 1989).
67
See Jeffers v Tucker, 847 F Supp 655, 657 (ED Ark 1994).
68
See id (noting that certain plaintiffs settled with state and upholding state’s  plan).
69
See New Mexico Legislative Council Service, A Guide to State and Congressional Redistricting in New
Mexico 10-11 (2001).
70
See id at 11-12. The DOJ objected to the original state senate plan, but within five weeks the legislature
had passed, and the DOJ had approved, a new plan. See id.
71
Though the 1980 redistricting cycle also may have been especially laborious for Arkansas and New
Mexico  because  the  critical  1982  amendments  to  Section  2  were  passed  after  the  states’  districts  already  had been
drawn. Less costly and lengthy litigation might have ensued had the states known in advance about the legal
standard with which they later were forced to comply.
72
See 2000s Redistricting Case Summaries, Nat’l  Conf  of  State  Legislatures (last visited Oct. 1, 2013),
online at http://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/redsum2000.htm [hereinafter 2000s Case
Summaries]. The latter explanation is more likely since the numbers of majority-minority  districts  in  Arkansas’s  
state legislative plans did not decrease between the 1990s and the 2000s.
73
Jeffers v Beebe, 895 F Supp 2d 920, 929 (ED Ark 2012). The district in question had a black voting-age
population  of  52.8  percent,  which  according  to  the  plaintiffs’  expert  was  insufficient  to  provide  African  Americans  
with an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidate. See id at 932-33.
74
Id at 933.
75
The  data  on  the  composition  of  Arkansas’s  state  legislative  districts  is  on  file  with  the  author.
65
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Unfortunately for present purposes,  New  Mexico’s  elected  branches  deadlocked  in  both  
the 2000s and the 2010s, forcing courts to design all  of  the  state’s  districts.76 While Section 2
supplied one of the principles on the basis of which the districts were shaped, it makes little
sense to probe the Section 2 – Section 5 gap when courts, not political actors, are the linedrawers. Arkansas’s  recent history also is suggestive but hardly conclusive; in particular, in the
absence of an actual denial of preclearance, it is very difficult to determine whether a district
plan in fact is retrogressive. Still, this Section 3 analysis is consistent with all of the other
empirical evidence presented in this Section about the procedural space between Section 2 and
Section 5. If anything, the Section 3 findings are especially compelling because they alone are
based on the experiences of jurisdictions that were subjected to—but then released from—
preclearance.
II. VOTE DILUTION
It is no surprise that the Arkansas and New Mexico cases both involved claims of vote
dilution arising from redistricting. While the VRA prohibits both vote dilution and vote denial,
the former has accounted for the vast majority of activity under both Section 2 and Section 5.77 It
therefore is the first substantive area to which I turn (and the area to which I devote more
attention). I begin by describing the differences between the districts to which Section 2 applies
and those protected by Section 5. Thanks to a series of narrowing interpretations by the Supreme
Court, Section 2 does not extend to districts that are bizarrely shaped or whose minority
populations are highly heterogeneous or below 50 percent in size. Section 5, in contrast, likely
shields districts with all of these characteristics.
Next, I use a range of empirical techniques to estimate the number of existing districts
that formerly were protected by Section 5 but now are beyond the scope of Section 2. No such
analysis yet has been conducted even though it is vital to determining the practical impact of
Shelby County. According to my calculations, only a handful of current districts are so noncompact, or have minority populations that are so small, that they are uncovered by Section 2.
However, many more current districts contain sufficiently heterogeneous minority populations
that they now may be dismantled without running afoul of the provision.
Lastly, I assess the likelihood, as a political matter, that the districts that populate the
Section 2 – Section 5 gap will be eliminated. Both parties often will have strong incentives to
preserve these districts, Republicans because of partisan advantage and Democrats due to
pressure from minority groups. But both parties sometimes will find it beneficial to jettison
previously insulated districts. Republicans may be able to win a larger proportion of seats by
76

See 2000s Case Summaries (cited in note 72); Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle – New Mexico,
All About Redistricting (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases-NM.php#NM.
77
See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at  11  (cited  in  note  39)  (noting  that  Section  2  cases  are  “dominated
by decisions involving challenges to at-large elections . . . and challenges to reapportionment plans”);;  Katz et al, 39
U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11) (same); Peyton McCrary et al, The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing
Section 5, in Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 20, 25 (cited in note 8); Rick Pildes and Dan
Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The Gap Between Perception and Reality, Election Law Blog
(Aug 19, 2013), online at http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54521 (“Redistricting  changes  generated  vastly  more
objections  [under  Section  5]  than  any  other  category  .  .  .  .”).
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concentrating minorities into a smaller number of super-packed districts. And Democrats may be
able to optimize their electoral position by spreading minorities more evenly across a district
map.
A. Conceptual Differences
In its first decision interpreting the current text of Section 2, Thornburg v Gingles,78 the
Supreme Court set forth the doctrinal standard for claims of vote dilution arising from
redistricting. Initially, a minority group must comply with three preconditions: (1) it must be
“sufficiently  large  and  geographically  compact  to  constitute  a  majority in a single-member
district”;;  (2)  it  must  be  “politically  cohesive”;;  and  (3)  “the  white majority [must] vote[]
sufficiently  as  a  bloc  to  enable  it  .  .  .  usually  to  defeat  the  minority’s  preferred  candidate.”79 If
these threshold criteria are satisfied, a court proceeds to an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances. The most important elements of this analysis are the nine factors identified by the
Senate  report  that  accompanied  Congress’s  amendments  to  Section  2  in  1982,80 as well as the
proportionality  of  a  minority  group’s  existing  representation.81 In order to prevail, a group also
must show that there exists a suitable benchmark with which the challenged policy may be
compared.82 A group must show as well that at least one additional district could be created in
which the group would be able to elect the candidate of its choice.83
Section 5, in contrast, almost never requires additional minority-ability (i.e.,  “ability”84)
districts to be drawn.85 Rather, the provision prohibits any worsening of the electoral position of
minorities, that is, retrogression.86 Retrogression is determined by examining a district plan in its
entirety, not by assessing individual districts in isolation.87 A plan is deemed retrogressive if it
reduces, relative to the plan previously in effect, the total number of districts in which minorities

78
478 US 30 (1986); see also Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 40-41 (1993) (applying the Gingles framework
to single-member districts).
79
Thornburg, 478 US at 50-51.
80
See id at 36-37, 44-45. These factors include any history of official discrimination, the extent of racial
polarization in voting, the use of election rules that overly advantage the majority, access to the candidate slating
process, the impact of discrimination on  minorities’  political  participation,  the  use  of  racial  appeals  in  campaigns,  
minorities’  prior  success  in  winning  office,  elected  officials’  responsiveness  to  minority  concerns,  and  the  
tenuousness  of  a  jurisdiction’s  justification  for  a  policy.  See id.
81
See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1000 (1994).
82
See Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 880 (1994).
83
See LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 437 (2006); Johnson,  512  US  at  1008  (“[T]he first Gingles condition
requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of [minority-opportunity  districts]  .  .  .  .”).
84
For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  use  the  term  “ability  districts”  to  refer  to  districts  covered  by  both  Section  2  
and Section 5. But the  term  “opportunity  districts”  technically  is  more  accurate  for  Section  2-covered districts since
the  provision  refers  to  the  “opportunity”  rather  than  the  “ability”  to  elect.
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The only exceptions are if the failure to draw additional ability districts establishes discriminatory intent
or if a jurisdiction must draw a larger number of districts (due to population growth, for example). See Texas v
United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133, 156-59 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013) (Texas II); see also note 129
(describing earlier period in which DOJ treated Section 2 violations as grounds for denying preclearance).
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See Beer v United States, 425 US 130, 141 (1976).
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See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 479 (2003).
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are able to elect the candidate of their choice.88 A plan also is unlawful under Section 5 if it is
motivated by any kind of discriminatory intent.89
At first blush, Section 2 and Section 5 would seem to have very similar coverage with
respect to the elimination of an existing ability district. Under Section 2, a minority group easily
would be able to show that an additional such district could be drawn because an additional such
district existed before it was dismantled. Likewise, under Section 5, the erasure of a district in
which minorities previously were able to elect their preferred candidate is the very definition of
retrogression. The statutory text confirms the apparent overlap of the two provisions. Section 2
forbids  district  plans  that  give  minority  members  “less  opportunity  .  .  .  to  elect  representatives  of  
their  choice,”90 while  Section  5  bans  plans  that  “diminish[]  the  ability”  of  minorities  “to  elect  
their preferred candidates  of  choice.”91 It would take no interpretive gymnastics to construe these
passages identically.
But this is not the path the Court has taken. Instead, in a series of decisions spanning two
decades, the Court repeatedly has narrowed the scope of Section 2. A clear substantive gap now
exists  between  Section  2  and  Section  5,  even  though  neither  the  provisions’  language  nor  their  
logic requires that there be such a gap. Below I lay out the three principal ways in which Section
2 and Section 5 diverge in their coverage. These distinctions have not previously been identified,
but together they mean that certain districts that used to be shielded by Section 5 now will be
bereft of any legal protection.
1. Geographic Compactness
First, in a line of cases in the 1990s involving allegations that districts were
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders, the Court held that highly non-compact districts are never
required by Section 2. If minority members are geographically distributed in such a way that
only a bizarre-looking district can enclose enough of them to enable the election of their
preferred candidate, then there is no liability under the provision. Even if minorities reside in a
manner that permits a reasonably compact ability district to be drawn (in which case there is
liability), it is an impermissible remedy to create a district that is too strangely shaped.92 The
Court thus declared that a district that tracked highway I-85  through  North  Carolina  “could  not  
remedy  any  potential  §  2  violation.”93 “No one looking at [the district] could reasonably suggest
88

See Texas v United States, 831 F Supp 2d 244, 262 (DDC 2011) (Texas I) (noting that Section 5 inquiry
“requires identifying districts in which minority citizens enjoy an existing ability to elect and comparing the number
of such districts in the benchmark to the number of such districts in a proposed plan”).  Under  the  approach  adopted  
by the Supreme Court in Georgia, but rejected by Congress in its 2006 amendments, the retrogression inquiry also
would have required consideration of the number of minority influence districts, the ability of minorities to
participate  in  the  political  process,  and  minorities’  legislative  power.  See Georgia, 539 US at 479-85.
89
See Texas II, 887 F Supp 2d at 151-52. Prior to its 2006 amendments, Section 5 had been interpreted to
prohibit only retrogressive intent. See Reno v Bossier Parish Sch Bd, 528 US 320, 328 (2000).
90
42 USC § 1973(b).
91
Id § 1973c(b).
92
See Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 979 (1996)  (“If,  because  of  the  dispersion  of  the  minority  population,  a  
reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority district; if
a reasonably compact district can be created, nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district that is far
from  compact.”).
93
Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 916 (1996).

16

that  the  district  contains  a  ‘geographically  compact’ population of any race.”94 Similarly, the
Court rejected a  Texas  district  that  “reaches  out  to  grab  small  and  apparently  isolated  minority  
communities.”95 “These  characteristics  defeat  any  claim  that  the  district[]”  was  necessitated by
Section 2.96
Under Section 5, on the other hand, compactness is largely irrelevant to the dispositive
question: whether  a  district’s  minority  residents  possess the ability to elect the candidate of their
choice. Whether minorities possess this ability depends on their number, turnout, and political
cohesion,  but  it  is  not  a  function  of  the  oddness  of  a  district’s  shape. Not surprisingly,
compactness has played no role in the Court’s  Section  5  decisions (nor in those of the lower
courts). It should be noted, however, that  during  the  2006  debate  over  Section  5’s  
reauthorization, several Republican senators argued that the goal of the amended provision was
to  “prevent  states  from  dismantling  .  .  .  ‘geographically compact majority-minority  districts.’”97
The DOJ also has stated that one of the factors it considers in assessing retrogression is the
“geographic  compactness  of  a  jurisdiction’s  minority  population.”98 These views have not been
embraced by the case law, but they do appear in the legislative history and agency guidance.
The upshot is that when a highly non-compact ability district is eliminated, there is
retrogression under Section 5 but there (most likely) is no violation of Section 2. The  district’s  
strange shape makes no difference in the Section 5 inquiry, but it clearly means that the district is
an invalid Section 2 remedy, and it implies as well that no reasonably compact district could be
drawn in the area. Accordingly, in the wake of Shelby County, most bizarre-looking ability
districts in the South may be dismantled with legal impunity. How many such districts exist is a
question to which I turn in Section II.B.
2. Minority Heterogeneity
The second way in which the Court has constricted the scope of Section 2 is by requiring
that a district not combine overly dissimilar minority communities. In the 2006 case of LULAC v
Perry, the Court held that Texas violated the provision when it disbanded an ability district near
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Id.
Bush, 517 US at 979.
96
Id. The case law is ambiguous as to whether it is the compactness of the district or of the minority
population that is relevant under Section 2. The passages from Bush and Shaw suggest that it is district compactness
that matters. This also has been the conclusion of lower courts adjudicating Section 2 cases. See Katz et al, 39 U
Mich J L Reform at 662-63 (cited in note 11). However, the original language in Gingles that gave rise to the
compactness  requirement  asks  whether  “the  minority group .  .  .  is  sufficiently  .  .  .  geographically  compact.”  
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 50 (1986) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy also has repeatedly expressed his
view  that  “[t]he first Gingles condition refers to the compactness of the minority population, not to the compactness
of the contested district.”  Bush, 517 US at 997 (Kennedy concurring); see also LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 432-33
(2006).
97
S Rep No 109-295, at 19 (2006) (quoting testimony of attorney Anne Lewis); see also id at 19 (claiming
that  new  Section  5  language  was  “designed to prevent legislators from intentionally ‘“cracking”’ or  ‘“fragmenting”’  
geographically compact  minority  voting  communities”  (quoting  testimony  of  NAACP  president  Theodore  Shaw)).
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Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed Reg 7470, 7471
(Feb 9, 2011).
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Laredo  that  contained  a  “cohesive”  Latino  population  with  “an  efficacious  political  identity.”99
Had the district not contained such a unified Latino community, it likely would not have received
Section 2 protection—a claim that can  be  made  confidently  thanks  to  the  Court’s  treatment  of  the  
remedial district that Texas created to compensate for its elimination of the Laredo-area district.
The remedial district enclosed a clear Latino majority, but nevertheless was rejected by the Court
because it merged “Latino  communities  .  .  .  [with]  divergent needs and interests owing to
differences in socio-economic status.”100 As  the  Court  put  it,  “[t]here is no basis to believe a
district that combines two farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests provides
the opportunity that § 2 requires.”101
Following LULAC, it appears that there is no liability under Section 2 when the relevant
minority  population  is  highly  “spatially  diverse”102 or  “culturally  non-compact.”103 It also
appears that a district including such a population is not a valid Section 2 remedy. This is the
case, at least, when the minority groups at issue are both socioeconomically dissimilar and
geographically separated.104 However, the degree of uncertainty associated with this articulation
of the legal standard is unusually high. LULAC remains the only Supreme Court case addressing
this aspect of Section 2 doctrine, and the lower courts have yet to confront many LULAC-based
defenses to otherwise valid Section 2 claims.105
Under Section 5, in contrast, the  heterogeneity  of  a  district’s  minority  population  is  
extraneous to whether the population has the ability to elect the candidate of its choice. If the
population has this ability, then the district that contains it is protected under Section 5—no
matter how similar or dissimilar the minority members may be. As with geographic
compactness, there is no hint in the Section 5 case law that retrogression is permissible if a
district happens to combine disparate minority communities. But as with compactness,
99

548 US 399, 435 (2006); see also id (noting  that  “there  has  been  no  contention  that  different  pockets  of  
the  Latino  population  in  [the  district]  have  divergent  needs  and  interests”).
100
Id at 424 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Id at 433.
102
This is the term I have used in earlier work to describe geographic entities (such as districts) whose
spatial subunits are highly heterogeneous. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev 1905,
1912-17 (2012); see also id at 1929-33 (arguing that spatial homogeneity has been an implicit Section 2 requirement
for decades).
103
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 Mich L Rev First Impressions 48, 50 (2006) (“If  the  
Court were to require that plaintiffs establish . . . cultural compactness, Section 2 claims would be much more
difficult.”);;  Richard  H.  Pildes,  The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 Ohio St L J 1139,
1146 (2007) (observing that after LULAC “the Act is not violated . . . unless an election district can be created . . .
[that  is]  geographically  and  culturally  compact”).
104
See LULAC,  548  US  at  435  (“We emphasize it is the enormous geographical distance separating the
Austin and Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these populations—not
either factor alone—that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes.”).
105
Lower court cases that have addressed the heterogeneity of minority populations under Section 2 include
Ga State Conf of NAACP v Fayette Cty Bd of Comm’rs, ___ F Supp 2d ___, 2013 WL 2948147, at *12 (ND Ga May
21,  2013)  (finding  that  African  Americans  in  two  nearby  towns  “share  common  socioeconomic  and  political  
concerns”),  Perez v Texas, 891 F Supp 2d 808, 836 (WD Tex 2012) (rejecting proposed district  that  was  “nearly  
identical”  to  district  rejected  in  LULAC), Fletcher v Lamone, 831 F Supp 2d 887, 899 (D Md 2011) (rejecting
proposed district that combined distinct African American communities in Baltimore and Washington, DC suburbs),
and Benavidez v City of Irving, 638 F Supp 2d 709, 722 (ND Tex 2009) (finding that although district contained
Hispanic  neighborhood  that  “may  differ  in  some  demographic  characteristics  from  the  core  area,”  neighborhood  was  
“geographically  close  to  that  core”  and  thus  district was valid Section 2 remedy).
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Republican senators argued in 2006 that the retrogression inquiry should take this factor into
account. According to the Senate report they penned,  “the  [new  Section  5]  language  seeks  to  
protect naturally occurring majority-minority  districts”  that  correspond  to  distinct  “‘minority  
voting  communities.’”106 This position has not been adopted by any judicial decision—though
the Supreme Court, of course, never had the opportunity to consider how the revised Section 5
should be applied to districts containing heterogeneous minority populations.
The consequence is that when a district that joins dissimilar minority communities is
eliminated, retrogression occurs under Section 5 but Section 2 (probably) is not breached. The
heterogeneity  of  the  district’s  minority population is immaterial under Section 5, but it indicates
that the district is not a permissible Section 2 remedy, and it also suggests that no district
containing a sufficiently homogeneous population could be created in the region. Thanks to
Shelby County, then, most southern districts that merge disparate minority groups now lawfully
may be dismantled. The number of these districts, again, is the subject of Section II.B.
3. Population Size
The final limitation the Court has imposed on Section 2 involves the size of minority
groups. In the 2009 case of Bartlett v Strickland, the Court held that in order for there to be
liability under the provision, it must be possible to create an additional district in which minority
members make up a majority of the population.107 “The  special  significance  .  .  .  of  a  majority  
means it is a special wrong when a minority group has 50 percent or more of the voting
population  and  .  .  .  is  not  put  into  a  district.”108 The Court hinted, however, that districts with
minority populations below 50 percent might be relevant on the remedial side of the Section 2
analysis. “States  can—and in proper cases should—defend against alleged § 2 violations by
pointing  to  .  .  .  effective  crossover  districts.”109 After Bartlett, it is clear that plaintiffs must prove
that another majority-minority district could be drawn, but it is uncertain whether a majorityminority district is the only permissible remedy once liability has been established.
Under Section 5, on the other hand, there is little doubt that districts with minority
populations below 50 percent are protected if these populations in fact are able (with crossover
support from white voters) to elect their preferred candidates. In the 2003 case of Georgia v
Ashcroft, interpreting the pre-amendment version of Section 5, the Court held that the provision
extends  to  “coalitions  of  voters  who  together  will  help  to  achieve  the  electoral  aspirations  of  the  
minority  group.”110 Similarly, the House report that accompanied Section  5’s 2006
reauthorization stated that it applies  to  “[v]oting changes that leave a minority group less able to
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S Rep No 109-295, at 19 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting testimony of NAACP president Theodore
Shaw); see also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174, 239
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Id at 24.
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539 US 461, 480 (2003); see also id at  484  (noting  that  “the  addition  or  subtraction  of  coalitional  
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elect a preferred candidate of choice, either directly or when coalesced with other voters.”111 And
in the lone case construing the amended version of Section 5 in the vote dilution context, the
court  explicitly  ruled  that  “[s]ince . . . crossover districts provide minority groups the ability to
elect a preferred candidate, they must be recognized as ability districts in a Section 5
analysis.”112 However, the Republican-drafted  Senate  report  contended  that  the  provision’s  new  
language  “would not lock into place [crossover] districts.”113
This means, once again, that when an ability district with a minority population below 50
percent is eliminated, there is retrogression under Section 5 but there (likely) is no violation of
Section 2. The smaller proportion of minority members is irrelevant under Section 5—as long as
it is sufficient to enable the election of their preferred candidate—but it suggests that no
majority-minority district can be drawn in the area, in which case there can be no Section 2
liability. How many ability districts exist in the South that are not majority-minority districts is
the final empirical issue that I investigate in Section II.B.
4. Further Twists
But before turning to the empirical analysis it is important to make three more points
about the relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 in the vote dilution context. First, while
until  now  I  have  stressed  the  provisions’  distinctions,  they  also  share  a  number  of  commonalities,  
including in areas where they could have been construed differently. For example, majorityminority and crossover districts do not exhaust the kinds of constituencies to which the VRA
might apply. The district taxonomy also includes coalition districts, in which different minority
groups join together to elect their mutually preferred candidate;114 and influence districts, in
which the minority population cannot elect the candidate of its choice, but can exert some sway
over who is elected and what she does once in office.115 Both Section 2 and Section 5 have been
interpreted to apply to coalition districts (at least when the combined size of the minority groups
is greater than 50 percent in the case of Section 2).116 And both Section 2 and Section 5 have
been interpreted not to apply to influence districts (although Section 5 did extend to them prior to
its 2006 revision).117
111
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Analogously, both Section 2 and Section 5 are violated when it is established that the
intent underlying a district plan is racially discriminatory. The current text of Section 5 declares
outright  that  the  provision  forbids  “any  discriminatory  purpose.”118 The role of motive in Section
2 analysis is less clear, but most lower courts have concluded that the provision is offended by
both discriminatory intent and discriminatory results.119 Notably, the Senate report that
accompanied  the  1982  amendments  to  Section  2  stated  that  “plaintiffs  must  either  prove  such  
intent,  or,  alternatively,  must  show”  the  presence  of  unequal  effects.120 Congress’s  objective in
revising Section 2 was to clarify that liability could stem from disparate impact, but it had no
intention of precluding claims based on invidious motivation.
Furthermore, the array of additional elements that must be demonstrated to prevail on a
Section 2 claim—minority political cohesion, racial polarization in voting, the nine Senate
factors, a lack of proportional representation, and the existence of a suitable policy
benchmark121—do not meaningfully distinguish the provision from Section 5. Minority cohesion
and racial polarization are not formally part of the Section 5 inquiry, but in practice they must be
shown in order to prove that a minority population has the ability to elect its preferred candidate.
“[A] court addressing a proposed voting plan under Section 5 must determine whether there is
cohesive voting among minorities and whether minority/White polarization is present in the
jurisdiction submitting the plan.”122 Likewise, the Senate factors play no role in the Section 5
analysis, either formally or functionally, but they typically are easy to establish in Section 2
cases in formerly covered areas. Most  of  the  factors  relate  to  a  jurisdiction’s  history  of  
discrimination, and the formerly covered areas include most of the jurisdictions with the most
egregious such histories.123
118
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interpretation).
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As for a lack of proportional representation, it too is not a requirement under Section 5,
but it too can be demonstrated without difficulty in a Section 2 suit. Both African Americans and
Hispanics are currently underrepresented in the state legislatures and congressional delegations
of every formerly covered state.124 Lastly, a suitable benchmark with which to compare a
challenged policy does not exist in certain kinds of vote dilution cases, such as municipal
annexations and objections to local governance structures.125 But there is no benchmark problem
in the redistricting context, in which the alternative district plan proposed by a Section 2 plaintiff
always may be compared to the plan currently in effect.126
The second point about the relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 is that it is both
dynamic and ambiguous. The relationship is dynamic because it shifts whenever the Court
interprets the provisions, Congress amends them, or the DOJ chooses how to enforce them. For
instance, the provisions’  gap was smaller with respect to redistricting before the Court began
limiting the scope of Section 2 in the 1990s.127 Similarly, the gap was larger before Congress
amended Section 2 in 1982 to clarify that it could be violated by discriminatory results even in
the absence of discriminatory intent.128 The gap was smaller as well when, in the 1990s, the DOJ
treated violations of Section 2 as grounds to deny preclearance under Section 5.129 And had the
Court  responded  to  Section  5’s  reauthorization by construing the provision narrowly, rather than
by striking it down, the gap again would have shrunk.
The relationship between the provisions also is ambiguous because their precise coverage
is uncertain. A generation after its current text was adopted, it remains unclear whether Section 2
allows crossover districts to be considered as remedies, whether it extends to coalition districts,
how it governs claims based solely on discriminatory intent, and how the homogeneity of
minority groups is to be determined.130 As Christopher Elmendorf  has  remarked,  “the  Supreme  
Court has failed to resolve basic conceptual questions about what constitutes an injury within the
meaning  of  the  statute.”131 If anything, the scope of Section 5 is even hazier. Before the 2006
124
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amendments to the provision, the Court addressed its application to redistricting only once, in a
decision that Congress partially reversed just three years later.132 Since 2006, the Court has not
expounded at all on the meaning of Section 5, and only a single lower court has explored how it
relates to redistricting.133 And congressional intent on the subject is more difficult than usual to
ascertain, thanks to dueling House and Senate reports that take nearly opposite stances on the
construction of key statutory terms.134
The final point about how Section 2 and Section 5 interrelate is that the former is not
always narrower than the latter. As I have discussed above, Section 2 is less effective than
Section 5 in several respects as a shield for existing ability districts. But, unlike Section 5,
Section 2 also can be wielded as a sword to win the creation of additional ability districts. When
plaintiffs meet the Gingles preconditions and show that the totality of circumstances supports
their claim, their reward—which is unavailable under Section 5—is an increase in the level of
minority representation.135
Because it can be used not just defensively but also for offense, Section 2 deserves much
of the credit for the growing minority presence in the halls of power in recent years. Following
the 1982 amendments to the provision, plaintiffs prevailed in many Section 2 suits throughout
the country, usually obtaining as remedies new ability districts.136 The result of this wave of
litigation  was  “a  quantum  increase  in  minority  representation”  in  the  1990s.137 In the U.S. House
of Representatives, for example, the number of African Americans elected from the South
jumped from five to seventeen.138 In the years since this representational spike, Section 5 has
played a vital role in preserving the gains made by minorities.139 But it was primarily Section 2,
not Section 5, that made the gains possible in the first place.
B. Empirical Gap
132
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The relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 thus is quite complex. But the key point
for present purposes is that certain districts that used to be protected by Section 5 now may be
eliminated without violating Section 2. How many such districts are there? Surprisingly, this is
the first Article to tackle this important question. To answer it, I first identify the existing
districts that, prior to Shelby County, were shielded by Section 5 because their minority residents
have the ability to elect the candidate of their choice. I then calculate the number of ability
districts that are too non-compact or that have minority populations that are too heterogeneous or
small to qualify for Section 2 coverage. These are the districts that fall into the Section 2 –
Section 5 gap.
1. The Section 5 Universe
The best way to determine if minority members in a district have the ability to elect their
preferred candidate—in which case the district formerly was protected by Section 5—is to
examine an array of past elections.140 Both district-specific  (i.e.,  “endogenous”)  and  statewide  or  
national  (i.e.,  “exogenous”)  elections  ideally should be considered.141 In combination, these
elections capture the size, turnout, and political cohesion of the minority population as well as
the extent of racial polarization in voting, and reveal how often the minority-preferred candidate
in fact prevails.142 Aided by a ten-day trial143 and fourteen separate experts,144 this was the
methodology that the only court to decide a Section 5 redistricting  case  after  the  provision’s  
2006 reauthorization employed.
Unfortunately, the optimal methodology strained the resources of the court and litigants,
and is infeasible for the entire universe of jurisdictions that previously were covered by Section
5. Exogenous data from the most recent presidential election, for example, is unavailable for
most state legislative districts,145 as is detailed knowledge about local political conditions. Since
I was unable to carry out the first-best form of analysis, I instead took the following approach.
First, I used Census data146 to find all of the congressional and state legislative districts in
formerly covered states in which minorities make up more than 50 percent of the citizen votingage population (CVAP). I included in my analysis all of the southern and southwestern states to
which Section 5 previously applied in large part or in full.147 I combined the African American
and Hispanic populations in each district because these groups tend to vote cohesively
140
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(particularly in general elections).148 I treated 50 percent as the threshold above which a
constituency automatically qualifies as an ability district because the Supreme Court took the
same shortcut in Georgia.149 And I focused on CVAP rather than total or voting-age population
because the Court also has done so and because CVAP is a superior measure of minority voting
strength.150
Second, I used Census data as well as demographic information about elected officials151
to locate all districts with a minority CVAP above 40 percent and a minority representative.
Political scientists have found that districts with CVAPs below 40 percent almost never elect
minority representatives, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be ability districts.152
Conversely, both political scientists and courts commonly have assumed that minority
representatives are the preferred candidates of minority members.153 Accordingly, when a district
has a CVAP over 40 percent as well as a minority representative, it is very probable that its
minority residents have the ability to elect the candidate of their choice.
Finally, I cross-checked the ability districts I identified with the limited available
exogenous data in order to see whether the districts voted for Barack Obama (the minoritypreferred presidential candidate) over Mitt Romney in 2012.154 At the congressional level,
twenty-four of the twenty-five districts I identified voted for Obama, and the only one that did
not was a toss-up.155 At the state level, all fifty-six of the districts I identified, and for which data
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was available, voted for Obama as well.156 These results help confirm that the districts I
identified indeed are ones in which minorities are able to elect the candidate of their choice.
Table 1 in the Appendix, then, lists by body and state all of the districts that formerly
were protected by Section 5.157 There are a total of 404 such districts, 25 in the U.S. House, 92 in
state senates, and 287 in state houses. In absolute terms, Georgia has the most such districts (77)
while Arizona has the least (18). As a share of all districts, Texas has the highest proportion of
previously shielded districts (33.6 percent) while Virginia has the lowest (12.6 percent). The gap
between the proportion of previously shielded districts and the statewide minority CVAP share is
highest in Virginia (10.4 percent) and lowest in Alabama (1.4 percent). Over the whole nine-state
region, the deviation from proportionality is 5.1 percent.
2. Geographic Compactness
Which of these formerly protected districts now may be disbanded because they are too
non-compact to qualify for Section 2 coverage? In a landmark 1993 study, Richard Pildes and
Richard Niemi identified eleven majority-black and majority-Hispanic U.S. House districts that
they believed might be in legal danger because of their odd shapes.158 They included in their list
all districts with sufficiently poor dispersion or regularity scores.159 A  district’s  dispersion  refers  
to how spread out its territory is, i.e., whether the district is long and narrow or essentially
circular.160 A  district’s  regularity  indicates how even its  perimeter  is,  i.e.,  whether  the  district’s  
borders are contorted or smooth.161 Of the eleven districts that Pildes and Niemi named, seven
were struck down by the courts over the course of the ensuing decade.162 Seven, that is, were so
non-compact that they were both constitutionally suspect and beyond the scope of Section 2.
This is a very impressive record that justifies my use here of the same compactness
methodology.
Accordingly, I first calculated dispersion and regularity scores for all of the districts that
previously were protected by Section 5.163 I then used the same cutoffs as Pildes and Niemi in
order to identify the districts that are so non-compact that they likely are uncovered by Section
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2.164 As Table 2 in the Appendix reveals, there are twenty-two such districts, five in Congress,
four in state senates, and thirteen in state houses.165 North Carolina and Texas account for all of
the strange-looking congressional districts, while Georgia and North Carolina lead the pack at
the state house level.166 (No state is especially noteworthy at the state senate level.) Figures 1 and
2 also display maps of the formerly protected districts with the very worst dispersion and
regularity scores. North  Carolina’s  Twelfth  Congressional District, which closely resembles the
constituency that gave rise to the racial gerrymandering cause of action in the 1990s,167 has the
lowest dispersion and regularity scores of any district in my study. North Carolina also features
four of the five most irregular ability districts in the South.

FIGURE 1: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST DISPERSION SCORES
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NC Congress 12

TX Congress 35

LA House 21

SC House 109

FIGURE 2: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST REGULARITY SCORES
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LA Senate 29

NC House 48

NC House 7

NC Congress 1

But while there do exist districts that are likely beyond the legal pale, the more important
point is that there are only very few such districts. If 22 districts are so non-compact that they
might be uncovered by Section 2, then 382 districts have shapes that are unproblematic under the
provision. Why are the vast majority of ability districts sufficiently compact to qualify for
Section 2 protection? The answer is probably that contemporary line-drawers have learned from
the dramatic events of the 1990s, when the courts struck down bizarre-looking ability districts
throughout the country. Line-drawers have found ways, that is, to continue drawing ability
districts while making their shapes less aesthetically offensive.168 Notably, there are more ability
districts today than there were in the 1990s, but, at least at the congressional level, the number of
highly non-compact  districts  (using  Pildes  and  Niemi’s  cutoffs)  has  fallen  from  eleven  to  five.
The other significant point about these statistics is that they are not a foolproof measure
of either liability under the Constitution or lack of coverage under Section 2. First, compactness
scores can be misleading because they stem, to some degree, from the shape of the states in
168
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which districts are located. It is not entirely surprising that North Carolina performs so poorly
given the contorted profile of its eastern shore.169 Second, the constitutional definition of a racial
gerrymander is a district that was created with  “race  [as]  the  predominant,  overriding  factor.”170
A  district’s  strange shape  is  “persuasive  circumstantial  evidence”  that  race  was  emphasized too
heavily,  but  it  is  not  a  “necessary  element  of  the  constitutional  wrong.”171 Third,  a  district’s  
strange shape also does not demonstrate conclusively that it is an invalid Section 2 remedy. As
noted earlier, some uncertainty lingers as to whether Gingles’s  compactness  requirement  applies  
to districts or to minority populations.172 And fourth, even if the requirement applies to districts,
that a reasonably compact district was not drawn does not necessarily mean that one could not be
drawn in the same area. If one could be drawn, then there indeed would be liability under Section
2 if an existing non-compact district was eliminated.
Notwithstanding these caveats, compactness scores are the best available proxy for both
racial gerrymandering and lack of Section 2 coverage due to strange district shape. And the clear
import of the scores is that very few current districts are so oddly configured that they now may
be dismantled without violating Section 2. Next I consider the empirical evidence about the
heterogeneity  of  ability  districts’  minority  populations—the second reason why a district
formerly protected by Section 5 now may be beyond the scope of Section 2.
3. Minority Heterogeneity
In  previous  work  of  mine,  I  developed  a  technique  for  measuring  the  “spatial  diversity”  
of districts.173 A district is spatially diverse when its geographic subunits vary markedly with
respect to a given factor. Conversely, a district is spatially homogeneous when its subunits are
mostly alike with respect to the factor. Spatial diversity also can be applied to  districts’  minority  
populations (as opposed to districts in their entirety).174 In this case, the concept indicates
whether similar or dissimilar groups of minorities have been combined in a district—that is,
whether similar or dissimilar minority communities have been merged. If dissimilar minority
communities have been merged, then a district may be an unlawful racial gerrymander, and it
also may be uncovered by Section 2.175
In my earlier work, I calculated spatial diversity scores with respect to composite factors
derived from a very large set of demographic and socioeconomic data from the Census.176 I also
used the Census tract as the spatial subunit for my analysis, and included information about all of
a  tract’s  residents  (rather  than  just  its  minority  members).177 Here I have refined my approach in
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several ways. First, I use the Census block group rather than the Census tract as my spatial
subunit. Block groups have about one-third the population of tracts,178 and thus allow spatial
diversity to be calculated more accurately, especially for smaller districts that contain relatively
few tracts.179 Second, I include only information about block  groups’  African  American  and  
Hispanic residents. I therefore am able to quantify the precise concept in which I am interested:
the  spatial  diversity  of  ability  districts’  minority  populations.180 And third, I incorporate many
fewer demographic and socioeconomic variables into my analysis, because the full range of data
is unavailable for minority members at the block group level. The variables that I incorporate
encompass age, marital status, education, occupation, and housing—a broad, though not
exhaustive, list.181
After assembling this dataset, I carried out a statistical procedure known as factor
analysis, which simplifies and renders intelligible large volumes of information.182 A single
composite factor emerged from the analysis, corresponding closely to socioeconomic status.183
The factor differentiates between block groups whose minority residents live in married
households, have a high household income, work in professional jobs, and own their homes; and
block groups whose minority residents have the opposite attributes.184 I then calculated factor
scores for all of the block groups in the nine states included in my study. These scores indicate
how the block groups’  minority  populations  perform  in  terms of the newly created factor.185
Lastly, I determined the standard deviation, with respect to the new factor, of the block groups
within each congressional and state legislative district. The higher the standard deviation, the
more likely it is that a district merges dissimilar minority communities, and vice versa.186
Table 4 in the Appendix, then, lists the 146 current districts whose spatial diversity scores
exceed that of the remedial district rejected by the Court in LULAC because  it  “combine[d] two
farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests.”187 These are the districts that now
may be eliminated because their minority populations are too heterogeneous to qualify for
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Section 2 protection. Of these districts, sixteen are in Congress,188 forty-one are in state senates,
and eighty-nine are in state houses.189 Georgia and Texas have the largest numbers of these
districts (thirty-three each), while Arizona has the fewest (just four).190 Figure 3 also displays
maps of the five worst-performing districts in the South, along with the district rebuffed in
LULAC. The darker a block group is colored, the higher its factor score is (and thus the higher
the socioeconomic status of its minority population).191 All of the mapped districts merge
dissimilar minority communities—typically disadvantaged urban areas and more affluent
suburbs—and therefore are likely beyond the scope of Section 2.
FIGURE 3: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST SPATIAL DIVERSITY SCORES

GA House 88

LA Senate 7

GA Senate 41

TX House 101
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AL House 77

TX Congress 25 (Old)

The most startling aspect of these findings is the sheer number of potentially unprotected
districts. The 146 districts with overly heterogeneous minority populations amount to more than
one-third of all districts formerly shielded by Section 5. If all of these districts were disbanded,
minority representation in the South would decline precipitously, thus realizing the worst fears
voiced by commentators after LULAC.192 Why is this segment of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap
so large when the compactness segment is so small? One possible answer is that line-drawers
have not yet internalized LULAC the  way  they  have  the  Court’s  racial  gerrymandering  
decisions.193 LULAC is a much more recent case, and to date it is the only Section 2 case to focus
so intently on the composition of districts’  minority populations. Another possibility is that
ability districts simply cannot be drawn in many areas in the South without combining disparate
minority communities. Minorities may be geographically distributed in such a way that districts
with more spatially homogeneous minority populations cannot be created—even if line-drawers
would like to create them.194
As with the compactness analysis, certain caveats about these findings must be
mentioned. First, the concept of spatial diversity captures variation only with respect to
quantifiable demographic and socioeconomic variables. To the extent that communities are
generated by subjective feelings of affiliation, their improper fusion cannot be detected by a
numerical score. Second, that a district contains an overly heterogeneous minority population
does not necessarily mean that liability under Section 2 cannot be established if the district is
eliminated. It may be possible in some circumstances to design a district with a sufficiently
homogeneous minority population in the same area, in which case there would be liability. And
third, the Court declared in LULAC that the remedial district was invalid both because it joined
dissimilar minority communities and because these communities were very far from one other.195
192

See Ortiz, 105 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 50 (cited in note 103); Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1146
(cited in note 103); Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1978-79 (cited in note 102).
193
See Pildes, 118 Harv L Rev at 68 (cited in note 168) (making internalization point in racial
gerrymandering context).
194
However, the record of Arizona, the only state in my study that relies on an independent commission to
design its districts, counsels against this interpretation. Arizona has fewer ability districts with overly spatially
diverse minority populations than any of the other eight states, perhaps because its independent commissioners
indeed are able to create ability districts without combining dissimilar minority communities.
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See LULAC, 548 US at 435.
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Districts that join dissimilar minority communities located near one another therefore may fall
within the ambit of Section 2.
To determine how many districts violate both of the LULAC criteria, I computed an
additional measure of compactness that indicates the dispersion of a  district’s minority
population.196 When a district’s  minority population is highly dispersed, minority communities
are likely to be far from one another (or at least to comprise a small share of the total minority
population in the broader area). As Table 4 in the Appendix reveals, only six ability districts
contain minority populations that are both more heterogeneous and more dispersed than that of
the district rejected in LULAC. If LULAC is construed narrowly, then, its impact may be much
less dramatic than my analysis initially suggested. Like the compactness criterion, it may expose
only a handful of unusual districts to elimination without any Section 2 recourse.
4. Population Size
The final reason why an ability district may fall into the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is that
its minority population is too small to qualify for Section 2 coverage. As discussed above,
Section 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate that an additional majority-minority district could be
drawn, while under Section 5 minorities may be able to elect their preferred candidate even if
they make up less than 50 percent of  a  district’s  population.197 To determine how many ability
districts in the South are not majority-minority districts, I simply counted the number of ability
districts with minority CVAPs below 50 percent. As Table 5 in the Appendix shows, there are
seventeen such districts, zero in Congress, six in state senates, and eleven in state houses.198
Arizona and South Carolina account for five of the six state senate districts, while Arizona,
Georgia, and South Carolina account for nine of the eleven state house districts.199
The key point about these findings again is the scarcity of ability districts that are not
majority-minority districts. If 17 districts are beyond the scope of Section 2 because of their
relatively small minority populations, then 387 districts have enough minority residents to raise
no legal hackles. The explanation for the scarcity likely is twofold. First, the Supreme Court
explicitly held in 2009 that there can be liability under Section 2 only if an additional majorityminority district can be drawn.200 Risk-averse jurisdictions may have sought to forestall Section
2 litigation by creating majority-minority districts in almost all areas in which their creation was
feasible. Second, the formation of majority-minority districts probably served the political
interests of the Republicans who controlled the redistricting process in eight of the nine states in
my study.201 If ability districts must be drawn, it is preferable from the Republican perspective to
196

See Richard G. Niemi et al, Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test
for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J Pol 1155, 1165-66 (1990) (discussing population measures of
compactness). Specifically, I calculated the population circle measure of compactness, but using minority rather than
total population as the input for the analysis.
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See Section II.A.3.
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See id.
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See All About Redistricting (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://redistricting.lls.edu/ (featuring
clickable map showing party in control of redistricting in each state).
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make their minority populations as large as possible, thus inefficiently packing Democrats into a
small number of constituencies.202
Some evidence for the partisan hypothesis comes from the record of Arizona, which
unlike all the other states in my study relies on an independent commission to draw its district
lines.203 Arizona has less than 5 percent of the 404 formerly protected districts, but it has more
than 40 percent of the ability districts with minority CVAPs below 50 percent.204 Because
Arizona’s  commission  did  not  try to enact a pro-Republican gerrymander, it had no reason to
create districts with artificially inflated minority populations. The below density curve, showing
the distribution of minority populations in all Republican-drawn districts in previously covered
states, provides further support for the partisan hypothesis. The distribution is clearly bimodal,
with one peak around 20 percent CVAP, where districts tend to be securely (but not
overwhelmingly) Republican, and a smaller peak around 60 percent CVAP, where Democrats
usually win by enormous margins. The distribution thus is close to optimal for maximizing the
number of Republican seats while still drawing the requisite number of ability districts. Notably,
there are almost no districts in the 30-50 percent CVAP range, in which Democrats are able to
prevail without wasting their votes in landslide victories.205
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See Cox and Holden, 78 U Chi L Rev at  588  (cited  in  note  7)  (noting  that  “packing  African  American  
voters [is] a second-best  strategy”  for  Republicans  who  are  compelled  by  VRA  to  create  majority-minority districts).
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See note 194 (noting that Arizona commission also created very few districts with overly heterogeneous
minority populations).
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See appendix table 5.
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See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 470, 487 (2003) (noting larger number of these districts in plan
drawn by Democrats). The size of this segment of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap thus depends on the partisanship of
the redistricting authority. This segment of the gap is small when Republicans draw district lines and large when
Democrats are in charge.
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Once again, a few caveats about these findings must be noted. First, because of the
Supreme  Court’s  ambiguity  in  Bartlett, it is not entirely clear that ability districts with minority
CVAPs below 50 percent are beyond the scope of Section 2. These districts may be valid
remedies even if the fact that they can be drawn cannot establish liability.206 Second, even if
these districts are not valid remedies, that a majority-minority district was not created does not
necessarily mean that one could not be created in a given area. If one could be created, then there
indeed would be liability if an existing ability district was dismantled. Lastly, the distribution of
minority populations suggests, but does not quite prove, that partisan advantage was the
dominant line-drawing motivation in the formerly covered states. The distribution was not very
different in earlier decades when Democrats were largely responsible for redistricting, probably
because the DOJ pressured states to draw majority-minority districts rather than ability districts
with minority CVAPs below 50 percent.207
C. Odds of Exploitation
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There are quite a few ability districts in the South, then, that may be eliminated in the
wake of Shelby County. Which of these districts in fact will be eliminated? It is too soon to know
for certain, but I explore below the reasons why both Republican and Democratic line-drawers
sometimes may wish to preserve the districts that populate the Section 2 – Section 5 gap—but
sometimes may wish to disband them.
To begin with, line-drawers from both parties may be unsure at times whether particular
districts may or may not be jettisoned. As discussed above, the contours of both Section 2 and
Section 5 are quite hazy,208 meaning that it often is unclear whether districts previously protected
by Section 5 now are covered by Section 2. Line-drawers may decide that discretion is the better
part of valor, preserving districts that perhaps do not need to be preserved in order to avoid the
cost and uncertainty of litigation. According to Bruce Cain and Karin MacDonald, this is
precisely the course that many jurisdictions chose after earlier Court decisions that allowed
ability districts to be eliminated. “[T]he  legal  advice  that  most  jurisdictions  [received]  was  .  .  .  .  .  
[p]reserve  the  status  quo  and  do  not  attract  attention.”209
Line-drawers from both parties also may be disinclined to exploit the Section 2 – Section
5 gap because they are satisfied with the status quo. Republicans, first, have found that the
creation of majority-minority districts allows the enactment of district plans that tilt dramatically
in their favor. By packing their opponents into majority-minority districts, they often can ensure
that popular support for Democrats does not translate into a commensurate number of legislative
seats.210 Notably, when many new majority-minority districts were drawn in the 1990s,
Republicans won about a dozen more congressional seats as a direct consequence,211 while also
making gains in every southern state legislature.212 Similarly, the recently enacted plans for the
2010 cycle—all passed while Section 5 was still in effect—arm Republicans with a distinct
electoral advantage. At the congressional level, the pro-Republican bias in the eight Republicancontrolled states in my study averaged 9.7 percent in 2012. If Republicans had received 50
percent of the vote in these states, that is, they would have won 59.7 percent of the available
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seats.213 One can see why Republicans might hesitate to upset such an auspicious political
landscape.214
In the increasingly rare instances when they are responsible for redistricting in the South,
Democrats too may have an incentive to retain the status quo. Minorities are very influential
members of the Democratic coalition (especially in the South, where whites are overwhelmingly
Republican), and they typically do not want existing ability districts to be eliminated. Quite
understandably, minorities tend to assign a high value to descriptive representation, even if it
comes at some cost to Democratic electoral prospects.215 But just as Republicans may keep
constant the number of ability districts while increasing their minority populations, Democrats
may maintain their number while reducing their minority populations to the lowest level that still
enables the election of the minority-preferred candidate. This, at any rate, was the approach the
Democrats took in Georgia in 2000, when they still controlled the redistricting process in a state
growing steadily more Republican. As the Supreme Court later recounted, Democrats did not
dismantle a single majority-black district, but they did “reduce[] by five the number of districts
with a black voting age population in excess of 60 percent,”  and  “increase[] the number of
districts with a black voting age population of between 25 percent and 50 percent by  four.”216
But while there may be favorable strategies for both parties that are consistent with the
preservation of existing ability districts, it does not follow that these strategies are optimal. In
fact, there is good reason to think that both parties could benefit electorally by eliminating at
least some current ability districts. Starting with the Republicans, they often could win even
more seats by converting ability districts, which are almost always carried by Democrats, into
Republican-leaning constituencies. Consider Georgia again, which has fourteen congressional
districts, four of which are ability districts whose minority populations likely are too
heterogeneous to qualify for Section 2 coverage.217 Free  from  Section  5’s  constraints,  
Republicans easily could redraw one or more of these districts so that their minority populations
no longer are large enough to elect Democrats (let alone minority-preferred candidates). The
only price Republicans would pay for such revisions is a somewhat lower margin of victory for
their  candidates  in  the  state’s  other  districts.
That the Section 5 regime was not optimal for Republicans also can be inferred from
Texas’s  actions  since  Shelby County in its ongoing redistricting litigation. The  Supreme  Court’s  
decision voided a lower  court’s  refusal  to  preclear  Texas’s  district  plans,218 at which point the
DOJ petitioned a different lower court to subject the state to preclearance under Section 3 of the
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VRA.219 If preclearance were consistent with the most pro-Republican possible outcomes, then
Texas might  have  been  expected  to  accede  to  the  DOJ’s  Section  3 request. But Texas did not
accede,  instead  filing  a  furious  memorandum  in  opposition  to  the  DOJ’s  motion.220 Texas’s  
“redistricting  decisions  [are]  designed  to  increase  the  Republican  Party's  electoral  prospects  at  
the  expense  of  the  Democrats,”  stated  the memorandum—a goal that presumably can be
achieved more easily in the absence of preclearance.221
The  status  quo’s  non-optimality for Republicans is further confirmed by recent
theoretical work by Adam Cox and Richard Holden.222 Cox and Holden demonstrate that the
ideal  strategy  for  maximizing  a  party’s  seats  is  not  to  “pack  and  crack”  the  opposing  party’s  
voters,  but  rather  to  “match  slices”  of  the  party’s  most  committed  supporters  with  slightly  
smaller  cohorts  of  the  opposing  party’s  most loyal backers.223 In southern states in which African
Americans vote more reliably Democratic than any other group, the implication is that
Republican line-drawers should create districts in which blacks make up slightly less than a
majority and steadfast conservatives make up slightly more than a majority. The implication, in
other words, is that Republican line-drawers should not create any ability districts at all. As Cox
and  Holden  put  it,  “there  is  no  plausible  distribution  of  African  American  voters  that  would  make  
it optimal for Republican redistricting authorities to create districts in which African Americans
make  up  a  []majority  of  voters.”224
If blacks in fact are the most dependable Democratic voters in the South, then the best
strategy for Democrats would be to maintain (or even increase) the number of ability districts,
but to combine slim black majorities with minorities of staunch conservatives.225 Such districts,
unlike most current ability districts, would elect black Democrats by very small margins. But if
there are at least some whites in the South who are as likely as blacks to vote for Democrats (in
college towns, for instance), then the best Democratic strategy would be to create districts in
which this liberal inter-racial coalition constitutes a slender majority. If the white populations of
such districts are large enough, then minorities might not be able to elect the candidates of their
choice. Similarly, if whites as heavily Republican as blacks are Democratic do not exist, or
cannot be joined with black communities due to geographic constraints, then the best Democratic
strategy would be to create districts in which blacks are a minority and white voters carry
Democratic candidates to victory. Again, minorities might not be able to elect the candidates of
their choice in such districts if their white populations are large enough.
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It should come as little surprise that the pre-Shelby County status quo was not optimal for
either party. The point of Section 5, after all, is to prevent the diminution of minority voting
strength, not to assure either party the most efficient possible conversion of its popular support
into legislative power. But now that Section 5 effectively has been nullified, both parties are
freer than they used to be to pursue their most electorally beneficial strategies. In at least some
cases, these strategies will entail the exploitation of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap—that is, the
elimination of districts previously protected by Section 5 but now uncovered by Section 2.
III. VOTE DENIAL
The VRA prohibits not only the dilution of the vote but also its denial. The vote may be
denied when franchise restrictions—such as photo ID requirements for voting, proof-ofcitizenship requirements for registering to vote, limits on voter registration drives, cutbacks to
early voting, and the like—prevent minority members from casting ballots. After several decades
in which few were adopted, franchise restrictions have surged in popularity in recent years. In
2011 and 2012 alone, nineteen states enacted some kind of ballot access limitation.226
In this Part, then, I explore the Section 2 – Section 5 gap in the context of vote denial. I
begin by describing how the provisions diverge substantively when vote denial claims are
asserted. Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to show not only that a statistical disparity
exists between minorities and whites, but also that a franchise restriction interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause the disparity. Under Section 5, on the other hand, a disparate
impact alone usually suffices to prevent a restriction from taking effect. However, these
statements of the operative standards necessarily are rather tentative. Thanks to the paucity of
lower court decisions—and the lack of any relevant Supreme Court precedent—it remains quite
unclear how either provision applies to vote denial.
Next I rely on case outcomes to estimate the magnitude of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.
For instance, no plaintiff yet has prevailed in a Section 2 challenge to a photo ID law, while three
such laws were blocked, at least temporarily, by Section 5. Similarly, a Florida law that curtailed
early  voting  was  denied  preclearance  with  respect  to  the  state’s  five  formerly  covered  counties,  
but upheld under Section 2 with respect to the rest of the state. But too much should not be made
of these few examples. Several franchise restrictions have been struck down under Section 2, and
several Section 2 defeats should be attributed to poor litigation tactics rather than  the  provision’s  
inherent limitations.
Lastly I assess the likelihood that the space between Section 2 and Section 5 will be
seized. Franchise restrictions commonly are thought to disadvantage Democrats, whose
supporters are considered less likely to be able to comply with them. Accordingly, when
Republicans are in control of state governments, their political incentives will point uniformly
toward the enactment of new ballot access limitations. Indeed, a spate of such measures already
have been passed by southern states in the brief period since Shelby County was decided.
Conversely, when Democrats are in charge, they will have no reason to try to restrict minorities’
ability to vote.
226
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A.

Conceptual Differences

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never decided a vote denial case under either
Section 2 or Section 5 of the VRA, likely because few franchise restrictions were adopted
between the statute’s enactment and the mid-2000s.227 In order to determine how the VRA
applies to vote denial claims, it thus is necessary to turn to the case law of the lower courts—
which itself is both sparse and somewhat muddled.228 Beginning with Section 2, the lower courts
are in agreement that a mere statistical disparity between minorities and whites does not suffice
to establish liability. As a Florida court recently put it,  “a plaintiff must demonstrate something
more than disproportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.”229
But  the  lower  courts  disagree  as  to  what  this  “something  more”  actually is. Some courts
require proof of proximate causation, that is, proof that the franchise restriction at issue is
directly responsible for the disparity between minorities and whites.230 If some other factor is
significantly implicated—e.g., lack of minority interest in the election,231 poverty unrelated to
discrimination,232 a different electoral regulation not contested in the litigation233—then a Section
2 claim cannot succeed. Other courts focus on the interaction between the franchise restriction
and social or historical patterns of discrimination.234 They  grant  relief  only  when  the  restriction’s  
disproportionate impact occurs because of such an interaction, for example, if discrimination is
227
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responsible  for  minorities’  lesser  education,  which  in  turn  makes  them  more  likely  to  misuse
complicated voting machines.235 And still other courts demand not just a statistical disparity but
also the satisfaction of relevant factors from the 1982 Senate report.236 Responsiveness to
minority concerns,237 a legacy of discrimination,238 and socioeconomic differences239 are the
factors that these courts most often have examined.
In contrast, a trio of decisions since Section 5 was reauthorized in 2006 have made clear
that a disproportionate impact does suffice for preclearance to be denied (as long as there also is
a non-trivial burden on voting). First, a court considering  Florida’s  cutback to early voting
declared  that  a  franchise  restriction  is  retrogressive  if  “(1) the individuals who will be affected by
the change are disproportionately likely to be members of a protected minority group; and (2) the
change imposes a burden material enough that it will likely cause some reasonable minority
voters not to exercise the franchise.”240 Next,  a  court  evaluating  Texas’s  photo  ID  law  denied
preclearance because the law disproportionately  affected  the  state’s  minority  voters  and  these  
voters  could  not  procure  valid  IDs  “without  cost  or  major  inconvenience.”241 Lastly, a court
assessing  South  Carolina’s  photo  ID  requirement concurred  that  “[a] state voting law has a
discriminatory retrogressive effect if the law disproportionately and materially burdens minority
voters when measured against the pre-existing state law.”242
The upshot of these divergent standards is that some franchise restrictions that previously
would have been blocked by Section 5 now will be sustained under Section 2. Sometimes a
plaintiff will be able to establish a statistical disparity between minorities and whites as well as a
material burden on voting—meaning that preclearance would have been denied—but will be
unable  to  show  the  “something  more”  required  for  Section  2  liability. For instance, a state might
enact a non-trivial ballot access limitation that disproportionately affects minority members. But
it might be unclear that the limitation itself is directly responsible for the disparate impact, or that
the limitation interacts in any meaningful way with patterns of discrimination, or that enough of
the relevant Senate factors are satisfied. In this scenario, the limitation would be retrogressive but
it would not contravene Section 2.
It is important, though, not to overstate the likelihood of this scenario. If a franchise
restriction disproportionately affects minorities, then it typically will be directly responsible for
the disparate impact that ensues. Only if another unrelated factor intervenes will the restriction
not be the proximate cause of the disparity. Similarly, the usual reason why a restriction
disproportionately affects minorities is that they are poorer or less educated, and the usual reason
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why they are poorer or less educated is a history of discrimination. It thus will be straightforward
in many cases to  show  that  a  restriction’s  interaction  with  discriminatory  conditions  gives rise to
the disparate impact. Lastly, as noted earlier, the Senate factors generally are not difficult to
establish in the mostly southern jurisdictions that formerly were covered by Section 5.243
Accordingly, few franchise restrictions that previously would have been denied preclearance
now will be upheld due to an inability to substantiate these factors.
B. Empirical Gap
The limited number of vote denial cases not only complicates the effort to determine how
Section 2 and Section 5 differ conceptually. It also makes it difficult to estimate the empirical
gap between the provisions—that is, the kind and quantity of franchise restrictions that could not
have withstood Section 5 review but that can survive scrutiny under Section 2. Still, it is possible
to reach some cautious conclusions based on both the recent spate of state-level restrictions and
the much larger volume of local policies assessed under the VRA over the last generation.
Beginning with the highest-profile limitations enacted in recent years, photo ID
requirements for voting, they have been sustained in both of the cases to date that addressed their
validity under Section 2. First,  a  challenge  to  Georgia’s  photo  ID  law  failed because of
inadequate proof of a disparity in ID possession between minorities and whites. “[T]he  Court
simply cannot agree . . . that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate . . . a substantial likelihood
of succeeding on the merits [on a]  §  2  vote  denial  claim.”244 Next, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc,  rebuffed  a  suit  against  Arizona’s  photo  ID  law, again on evidentiary grounds. The court
noted  that  the  plaintiff  “alleged that  ‘Latinos  .  .  .  are less likely to possess the forms of
identification required under [the  law]  to  .  .  .  cast  a  ballot,’ but produced no evidence supporting
this allegation.”245
In contrast, three photo ID requirements were denied preclearance, at least temporarily,
under Section 5. In 1994, the DOJ objected to Louisiana’s photo ID law because African
Americans  were  “‘four  to  five  times  less  likely  than  white  persons  in  the  state to possess a
driver’s  license  or  other  picture  identification  card.’”246 In 2012, a court denied preclearance to
Texas’s  photo  ID  law  because  “the burdens associated with obtaining ID will weigh most heavily
on the poor”  and  “racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty.”247
And  also  in  2012,  another  court  denied  preclearance  to  South  Carolina’s  photo  ID  law  for  the  
next election, but allowed the measure to take effect thereafter.248
The  fate  of  Florida’s  recent  cutback  to  early  voting also suggests that franchise
restrictions fare better under Section 2 than under Section 5. A statewide Section 2 challenge to
the cutback failed because of pledges by several counties to offer the largest possible number of
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hours of early voting (which was equal to the number required under prior law).249 But a court
denied preclearance to the cutback with respect to the five Florida counties formerly covered by
Section  5,  reasoning  that  “there  is  much  that  we  do  not  know  about  how  the  new  law  will  be
implemented.”250 The court in the Section 2 case unsubtly hinted that it would have reached a
different decision had it evaluated the cutback under Section 5. “The important distinction
between a Section 5 and a Section 2 claim plays a significant role in the  Court’s  decision in this
case.”251
Further evidence for the greater efficacy of Section 5 comes from a comparison I
conducted of the  DOJ’s  preclearance  objections  since  1982252 with recorded Section 2 decisions
over the same period.253 As Table 6 in the Appendix shows, the scorecard of Section 2 litigation
was mixed with respect to most kinds of franchise restrictions, while several restriction types
were blocked repeatedly by Section 5. For example, polling place eliminations were prevented
nineteen times by Section 5, but only three successful suits and three unsuccessful suits against
such actions were filed under Section 2.254 Similarly, election date alterations were thwarted
fifteen times by Section 5, but there was not a single Section 2 challenge, victorious or
otherwise, to such changes.255 And revisions to voter registration procedures were blocked ten
times by Section 5, while five Section 2 cases against such amendments succeeded and four
failed.256 In sum, I counted seventy-three denials of preclearance to franchise restrictions,
compared to eighteen successful Section 2 claims and nineteen unsuccessful claims.257
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However, it is unclear whether these statistics should be attributed to  the  provisions’  
divergent standards for liability or to their procedural distinctions.258 The reason why franchise
restrictions were upheld more often under Section 2 could be its allocation of the burden of proof
to the plaintiff—not subtle distinctions between disparate impact alone and disparate impact plus
“something  more.”259 Likewise, the reason why the volume of blocked restrictions was higher
under Section 5 could be that private parties lacked the resources to mount Section 2 challenges
to all of the measures they believed to be discriminatory. Unlike in the vote dilution context,
where it can be determined with some certainty whether districts are protected under Section 2
and/or Section 5,260 the  provisions’  substantive  and  procedural  differences  are  almost impossible
to disentangle with respect to vote denial.
In addition, neither the potency of Section 5 nor the frailty of Section 2 in this domain
should be exaggerated. For instance, while three photo ID requirements were blocked by Section
5, at least temporarily, the DOJ did not object to several other such measures. It allowed photo
ID laws passed by South Carolina in 1984, by Louisiana in 1997, by Alabama in 2002, by
Arizona in 2004, by Georgia in 2005, and by New Hampshire and Virginia in 2012, all to go into
effect.261 Conversely, that past Section 2 suits against photo ID laws have failed does not mean
that future actions will be doomed as well. The plaintiffs in the Arizona and Georgia cases both
lost because they were unable to present evidence of a disparity in ID possession between
minorities and whites.262 But this sort of evidence has proliferated in recent years, in both
academic studies263 and Section 5 proceedings,264 and it likely will feature prominently in future
Section 2 challenges.
Analogously, a key reason why Florida’s  cutback  to  early  voting  was  sustained  under
Section 2, but struck down under Section 5, is  the  more  accurate  information  about  counties’  
intentions that was available by the time of the Section 2 decision. The Section 5 court
emphasized  that  it  “ha[d] not been presented with a specific voting plan from any of the five
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covered  counties,”  and  thus  was unaware whether, and to what degree, the counties would
reduce their early voting hours.265 In contrast, the Section 2 court  received  notice  that  “32  of
Florida’s  67  counties  will  offer  the  maximum  number  of  early  voting  hours,”  and  based  its  
decision largely on this data.266 Had the Section 5 court known  about  the  counties’  plans,
“Florida  would  likely  [have  been]  able  to  meet  its  burden  of  demonstrating  that the overall effect
of  the  changes  would  not  be  retrogressive.”267 And had the Section 2 court not known about the
plans,  it  would  have  concluded  that  the  “change  [would]  impose  a  material  burden  on  ‘AfricanAmerican  voters’  effective  exercise  of  the  electoral  franchise.’”268
The figures I provided about DOJ objections and Section 2 cases since 1982 also must be
taken with a grain of salt. For one thing, the number of objections is dwarfed by the number of
preclearance submissions that the DOJ did not oppose. According to a report by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, between 1982 and 2004, the DOJ objected to only 0.1 percent of
changes involving precincts, polling places, or absentee voting, 0.1 percent of changes involving
voter registration procedures, and 0.2 percent of changes involving special elections.269
Compared to these tiny percentages, the near-50 percent success rate I calculated for Section 2
litigation over franchise restrictions seems quite respectable.270 Moreover, my count of Section 2
cases almost certainly is underinclusive because I, like Katz, was able to identify only recorded
decisions.271 Katz found 160 total Section 2 suits in formerly covered areas between 1982 and
2005,272 but, including unpublished decisions, there actually were 653 successful such actions
over this period.273 The true volume of Section 2 activity in the vote denial context therefore
must be substantially higher than my data indicates.
A final caveat is that, under certain unusual circumstances, Section 2 may be more
effective than Section 5 at invalidating franchise restrictions. In particular, when a jurisdiction
loosens but does not eliminate an existing restriction, the policy change may be non-retrogressive
but still in violation of Section 2. This sort of scenario unfolded in Mississippi in the 1980s,
when the state partially dismantled its notorious dual registration system, which had long
required voters to register in two different ways in order to be able to participate in all
elections.274 The amendments to the system were precleared by the DOJ because they made it
easier for African Americans to register.275 But in a subsequent Section 2 action, a court struck
down the revised regime, which still required dual registration for residents of smaller towns,
because  of  its  “disparate  impact  on  blacks  .  .  .  ‘who  are  unable,  because  of  disproportionate  lack  
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of  transportation  .  .  .  to  travel  to  the  offices  of  the  county  registrar.’”276 It thus was Section 2, not
Section 5, that finally brought to an end one of the  South’s  most  discriminatory  registration  
practices.
Accordingly, the empirical evidence on the size of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is mixed.
On the one hand, more franchise restrictions, especially of the higher-profile sort, have been
blocked by Section 5 than by Section 2. On the other hand, the available data likely understates
the true performance to date of Section 2, and there is reason to think that the provision could be
even more effective in the future. On balance, the safest conclusion is that there is substantive
space between Section 2 and Section 5—but that it is not as extensive as it first might seem.
C. Odds of Exploitation
If there indeed is space between the provisions, will it be seized now by politicians in
formerly covered areas? This question is easier with respect to vote denial than it was with
respect to vote dilution.277 When Republicans are in control of jurisdictions, the answer almost
certainly is yes. When Democrats are in charge, the answer most likely is no.
Franchise restrictions commonly are thought to benefit Republicans because they are
more difficult for poorer and less educated voters, who lean Democratic by large margins, to
comply with.278 When Pennsylvania passed a photo ID requirement in 2012, for instance, the
majority leader of the state house famously declared that “[v]oter  ID  .  .  .  is  gonna  allow  
Governor  Romney  to  win  the  state.”279 This is an area in which the conventional wisdom is
correct (if somewhat overstated). According to several studies, photo ID laws reduce overall
turnout by 2-3 percent and produce a pro-Republican swing of 1-2 percent.280 Other common
restrictions, such as the elimination of election-day registration and felon disenfranchisement,
also give rise to modest pro-Republican shifts.281
The political incentives of Republicans in formerly covered areas thus support the
enactment of additional ballot access limitations. By enacting such limitations, they favorably
alter the composition of the electorate and make it more likely that Republican candidates will
win office. Not surprisingly, southern states controlled by Republicans have passed or
implemented an array of new limitations in the brief period that has elapsed between Shelby
County and the writing of this Article.282 Photo ID laws that had been blocked in Mississippi
276
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(due  to  the  DOJ’s  request  for  more  information)  and  Texas  (due  to  the  court’s  denial  of  
preclearance) now are on the verge of becoming operative.283 Photo ID laws scheduled to go into
effect in 2014 in Alabama and Virginia now will do so without any prior need for
preclearance.284 Florida has resumed its effort to purge non-citizens from its voter rolls.285 And
North Carolina has passed an omnibus bill that includes a photo ID requirement, a cutback to
early voting, and the elimination of election-day registration.286 It has not taken very long, then,
for Republicans to begin exploiting the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.
Conversely, Democrats have little reason to take advantage of the gap. They realize that
franchise restrictions disproportionately harm their own most loyal supporters, and thus oppose
the measures fiercely wherever they are proposed.287 Were Democrats to find themselves in
power in any southern state, their political calculus clearly would counsel against the adoption of
any new restrictions. In fact, the optimal Democratic strategy would be to expand access to the
polls, through policies such as longer voting hours, more flexible registration procedures, and
greater absentee and early voting. This is the approach that Democrats have taken recently in
states where they are in charge of the elected branches.288 It also is the approach that Democrats
would likely espouse were they to win back control of any formerly covered jurisdiction.
IV. CLOSING THE GAP
The analysis to this point has been descriptive rather than prescriptive. It has
demonstrated that substantial space exists between Section 2 and Section 5, both procedurally
and substantively, and that the space is likely to be seized by southern politicians. But it has not
addressed how the Section 2 – Section 5 gap might be closed, either legislatively or judicially. In
this Part, then, I discuss a series of steps that Congress or the Supreme Court could take in
response to Shelby County. I explain how the steps would shrink the Section 2 – Section 5 gap,
while also pointing out their legal and political limitations.
But before turning to these options, it is worth considering the case for doing nothing—
always the most likely scenario in our cumbersome political system. From a partisan perspective,
Republicans should cheer inactivity at the national level since it would enable them to enact
more favorable district plans as well as more stringent franchise restrictions.289 Putting aside
partisan advantage, one can agree  with  this  Article’s  findings  and  still  support  the  status  quo  if  
one does not consider the cause of minority representation to be particularly important. The
interaction  of  politicians’  incentives  with  the  Section 2 – Section 5 gap probably will give rise to
283
See Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws (cited in note 17); Photo Identification
Requirements (cited in note 261).
284
See id.
285
See Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Efforts to Police Voters (cited in note 17).
286
See Aaron Blake, North Carolina Governor Signs Extensive Voter ID Law, Wash Post (Aug 12, 2013),
online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/12/north-carolina-governor-signsextensive-voter-id-law/.
287
See, for example, Crawford v Marion Cty Elec Bd, 553  US  181,  203  (2008)  (“Democrats  were  
unanimous  in  opposing  [Indiana’s  photo  ID  law].”);;  Common Cause/Georgia v Billups, 406 F Supp 2d 1326, 1331
(ND  Ga  2005)  (Georgia’s  photo  ID  law  voted  for  by  just  two  Democrats  in  state  house  and  zero  in  state  senate).
288
See Reid Wilson, Democrats Push Back on Voting Rights, Wash Post (Aug 19, 2013), online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/08/19/democrats-push-back-on-voting-rights/.
289
See Sections II.C, III.C.

48

policies that are electorally worse for minorities than those adopted under the prior regime. But
this is a problem only if  one  is  concerned  about  minorities’  electoral  position  in  the  first  place. If
one is indifferent to their position, or more interested in other issues, then indifference is indeed
the appropriate reaction to Shelby County.
A. Section 4
Assuming that Congress is concerned about minority representation, however,290 there
are several actions it could take to undo the  damage  inflicted  by  the  Court’s  decision. First,
Congress  could  accept  the  Court’s  invitation  to  “draft  another  formula  based  on  current  
conditions.”291 Most of the metrics that commentators have suggested would result in many of
the formerly covered jurisdictions once again becoming subject to preclearance, thus eliminating
in one stroke the bulk of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.292 For example, Bernard Grofman293 and
Ellen Katz294 have proposed basing a new formula on the rate of successful Section 2 litigation in
each state. Setting the bar at five winning cases per million residents would cause Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Texas to be covered.295 All of these states except Montana formerly were covered in part or in
full by Section 4 or were bailed in under Section 3.
Similarly, Stephen Ansolabehere and others have written extensively about racial
polarization in voting,296 which  “increase[s]  the  political  vulnerability  of  racial  and  language
minorities.”297 The seven states in which white voters preferred McCain to Obama by at least
forty percentage points in 2008 were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, and Texas.298 All of these states except Oklahoma used to be covered by Section
4. And Christopher Elmendorf and Douglas Spencer have focused attention on the persistence of
racially discriminatory attitudes among white voters, which may make de jure discrimination
more likely. The six  states  that  have  the  highest  proportions  of  whites  whose  views  of  blacks’  
290

I realize, of course, that this may not be an accurate assumption for many members of Congress.
Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013).
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For additional efforts to devise new coverage formulas, see Spencer Overton, The Coverage Curve:
Identifying States at the Bottom of the Class, in Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 242, 245, 252
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covered in part or in full), and Michael P. McDonald, Who’s  Covered?  Coverage  Formula  and  Bailout, in Epstein et
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See Bernard Grofman, Devising a Sensible Trigger for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 Election L
J 332, 334-35 (2013) (using cutoff of ten successful Section 2 challenges and identifying Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia as states that would be covered).
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See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 876 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013). This figure
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See Ansolabehere et al, 123 Harv L Rev 1385 (cited in note 122); see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al,
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298
Exit poll data from 2008 is available at Election Center 2008 – Results, CNNPolitics.com (last visited
Oct 1, 2013),online at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/president/. Unfortunately, 2012 exit poll data is
not available for all states.
291

49

intelligence and work ethic are more negative than the national median are Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.299 All of these states except Wyoming
previously were covered jurisdictions.
These metrics have decent hopes of being upheld by the Court because, unlike the
stricken  Section  4,  they  rely  on  “current  data  reflecting  current  needs.”300 The racial polarization
and racial attitude figures are only a few years old, while the Section 2 statistics capture cases
from the last couple decades. The metrics also are attractive because they would neatly close
most of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. The majority of the formerly covered jurisdictions once
again would be subject to preclearance, thus largely restoring the status quo ante.
However, it is unclear whether the Court is willing to countenance any further use of the
preclearance remedy. Its opinion in Shelby County emphasized that preclearance can be justified
only  by  “exceptional”  conditions,301 and observed in dicta that the claim that preclearance is now
inherently  invalid  “ha[s]  a  good  deal  of  force.”302 The probability of Congress passing a new
coverage formula also is low. Any new formula would sweep in at least a few additional
jurisdictions, which likely would complain vociferously about their inclusion.303 And even
formerly covered jurisdictions might object to being singled out by current data that implies that
they continue to discriminate against minorities.304
B. Section 3
The second option for shrinking the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is for plaintiffs to use
Section 3 more aggressively to bail in jurisdictions—or, even better, for Congress to amend the
provision so that it is easier to satisfy. To date, plaintiffs rarely have invoked Section 3 and
courts rarely have subjected jurisdictions to preclearance pursuant to it.305 But in the future,
plaintiffs could insert Section 3 claims into almost all of their voting rights lawsuits.306 If they
were to prevail on these claims, then a substantial number of jurisdictions would be compelled to
preclear their election law changes, thus reinstating part of the regime struck down in Shelby
County. However, even if many Section 3 claims succeeded, the result would be an odd
patchwork in which coverage corresponded to litigation victories but not necessarily to actual
racial discrimination in voting. And many claims probably would not succeed because Section 3,
299
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Id at 2618, 2624, 2630-31.
302
Id at 2625.
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district plans. See note 219; see also Complaint, United States v Texas (SD Tex Aug 22, 2013), *13. Private parties
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unlike Section 2, requires a judicial finding that a jurisdiction has engaged in intentional
discrimination.307 Courts often are reluctant to deem a jurisdiction a deliberate discriminator;
indeed, this was the very reason why Section 2 was revised in 1982 to permit liability based
solely on discriminatory effects.308
Both of these shortcomings, though, could be mitigated somewhat by congressional
action. If Congress were to amend Section 3 so that preclearance applies not only to the
jurisdiction found to have engaged in discrimination, but also to all of its constituent subunits,
then bail-in claims would result in more geographically uniform coverage. More importantly, if
Congress were to make a violation of Section 2 rather than a constitutional breach the trigger for
Section 3 preclearance, then Section 3 claims would become much easier to win. As Travis
Crum  has  commented,  “[a]n  effects  test  [for  Section  3]  .  .  .  would  likely  result  in  many  more  
jurisdictions  covered,”  thus  producing  greater  convergence  with  the  former  scope of Section 4.309
However, Congress may be unable to pass any legislation on the controversial subject of
preclearance as long as it remains under divided partisan control. Moreover, even a supercharged
Section 3 would not result in all of the formerly covered jurisdictions once again becoming
subject to preclearance (barring an unprecedented effusion of voting rights suits). And the Court
may not look kindly on an attempt to link the Section 3 remedy of preclearance to a violation of
Section 2. A garden-variety Section 2 offense may not be  sufficiently  “exceptional,”  in  the  
Court’s  view, to justify preclearance.310
C. Section 2
Congress’s  final  option  for  reducing  the  size  of  the  Section  2  – Section 5 gap—and the
one that follows most directly from  this  Article’s  analysis—is to amend Section 2 itself so that it
more closely resembles Section 5. On the procedural side, Congress could (1) institute a burdenshifting framework under which the onus would switch to the jurisdiction once a plaintiff makes
a preliminary showing of harm; (2) increase the availability of preliminary injunctions, perhaps
by authorizing their issuance whenever the preliminary showing is made; and (3) consolidate or
eliminate some of the elements that must be proven to establish liability (especially the plethora
of Senate factors). In combination, these steps would address all of the process-related reasons
why policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5 now may go into effect. They
would make the jurisdiction bear more of the burden of proof; they often would make suspension
of a policy the default before a decision on the merits is reached; and they would reduce the cost
and complexity of Section 2 litigation. Section 2 suits would not be identical to Section 5
preclearance proceedings, but they would be as close as possible while still retaining their
character as conventional causes of action.
With respect to vote dilution, similarly, Congress could reverse the Court decisions that
have made Section 2 inapplicable to districts that are bizarrely shaped or whose minority
307
See 42 USC § 1973(c) (requiring constitutional violation for Section 3 to apply, which in turn requires
showing of discriminatory intent).
308
See note 120 and accompanying text.
309
See Travis Crum, Note, The  Voting  Rights  Act’s  Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic
Preclearance, 119 Yale L J 1992, 2037 (2010).
310
See id (“But  this  change  may  also  make  section  3  more  vulnerable  to  constitutional  attack.”).
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populations are overly heterogeneous or below 50 percent in size. If Congress undid these
decisions, then there generally would be Section 2 liability if a constituency in which minorities
were able to elect the candidate of their choice was dismantled. There generally would be
Section 2 liability, that is, in the exact circumstances in which there is retrogression under
Section 5. The shape of a district and the makeup and magnitude of its minority population
would be immaterial under both provisions. Lastly, with respect to vote denial, Congress could
make disparate impact alone the standard for a Section 2 violation (in this case without
disturbing any Court precedents). The criteria for liability under Section 2 and retrogression
under Section 5 then would be identical. Additional elements such as causation or interaction
with patterns of discrimination would not have to be demonstrated under either provision.
These Section 2 revisions may be easier for Congress to pass than changes to Section 3 or
Section 4 because they do not aim to impose preclearance on any jurisdiction. It is preclearance,
with its attendant loss of state sovereignty, that always has been the most provocative feature of
the VRA, and it is preclearance whose salience recently was heightened by Shelby County.
Responses to the decision that focus on other aspects of the VRA therefore may be more
palatable in the current political environment. In 1982, notably, a divided Congress and a
Republican President managed to enact more sweeping amendments to Section 2 than those
proposed here after an earlier Court case limited both constitutional and statutory claims of vote
dilution.311 Political dynamics have changed over the last generation, but this is still an
auspicious precedent.
Revisions to Section 2 have the further advantage that they may be more likely to survive
the  Court’s  scrutiny  than  efforts  to  recreate  the  preclearance  regime. There is now a decision on
the books striking down the only coverage formula ever passed by Congress and casting doubt
on the validity of preclearance under any circumstances. But there is no equivalently adverse
decision in the Section 2 context. Individual Justices occasionally have expressed their
dissatisfaction with the provision,312 but the full Court never has implied that it is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, a procedurally streamlined and substantively strengthened Section
2 would have reasonable odds of repelling a constitutional attack. None of the changes advocated
here would make the provision much more legally vulnerable than it already is.
On the other hand, that Congress is more likely to amend Section 2 than Section 3 or
Section 4 does not mean that it actually is likely to do so. Congressional inaction is always the
safest bet in periods of divided government, especially with respect to laws that touch on highly
sensitive issues of race and political power. The case for the constitutionality of a fortified
Section 2 also is far from ironclad. Because it is a disparate impact provision, Section 2 already
prohibits a wide range of conduct that is not motivated by invidious intent and thus is
constitutionally permissible. If it were revised to prohibit even more such conduct, one could
easily imagine the Court that decided Shelby County concluding  that  it  too  exceeds  Congress’s  
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enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.313 A reinforced Section 2 might
clash  as  well  with  the  Court’s  ban  on  racial  gerrymandering, which forbids race from playing too
large a role in districting decisions. Indeed, Justice Kennedy warned in Bartlett that, “[i]f  §  2  
were  interpreted  to  require  crossover  districts  throughout  the  Nation,  ‘it  would  unnecessarily  
infuse race into  virtually  every  redistricting,  raising  serious  constitutional  questions.’”314
One final (though unlikely) scenario for strengthening Section 2 also should be noted. In
the event that Congress is unable to act, the Court itself could eliminate much of the Section 2 –
Section 5 gap by revisiting its Section 2 precedents and deciding open questions in favor of
greater liability.315 On the procedural front, the Court probably could not change the burden of
proof or the availability of preliminary injunctions—which are set, respectively, by the statutory
text316 and  by  unrelated  case  law  on  courts’  equitable powers317—but it could greatly simplify
the elements that must be proven to establish a Section 2 violation. The profusion of these
elements is squarely the fault  of  the  Court’s  own  decisions,  not  the  language  of  Section  2,318
meaning that doctrinal rationalization could be accomplished through judicial intervention. With
respect to vote dilution, likewise, it is the Court, not the statutory text, that has produced the
geographic compactness, minority heterogeneity, and minority size requirements for
redistricting.319 The Court therefore could waive these requirements even if Congress remains
inactive. And with respect to vote denial, the Court has not yet specified the standard for Section
2 liability, and the language of the provision does not resolve the matter either.320 The Court thus
would be writing on a clean slate if it were to embrace disparate impact alone as the operative
test.
Of course, there is little chance that the same Court that consistently has narrowed the
scope of Section 2 over the last generation suddenly will change course. It probably would take a
shift  in  the  Court’s  membership  for  it  to  begin  loosening  the  procedural  and  substantive  
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limitations that it has imposed on Section 2 over the years.321 Judicial revision of Section 2
doctrine also is complicated by the “special  force”  of  stare  decisis  in  the  statutory  interpretation  
context.322 Because Congress is free to overturn statutory constructions of which it
disapproves—a power it repeatedly has exercised vis-à-vis the VRA323—the Court tends to
adhere to its rulings unless they have proven manifestly unworkable. Strikingly, there does not
seem to be a single instance in which the Court explicitly has reversed one of its earlier readings
of the VRA.
*

*

*

The upshot of this analysis is that there are no easy ways to close the Section 2 – Section
5 gap. There are no options, that is, that are clearly effective from a policy perspective, passable
by Congress given the current political climate, and likely to survive review by the Court. This
conclusion should not be especially surprising. A provision as potent as Section 5 is hard to
replace, a divided government typically enacts little legislation of any kind, and the Court cannot
be expected to turn a blind eye to attempts to sidestep Shelby County when the ink on the
decision is barely dry. But the conclusion also does not necessarily apply in the long run. If
Democrats were to win unified control of the federal government, and if  the  Court’s  membership  
were to shift in a more progressive direction, then there would be a high likelihood that
amendments to the VRA would be both passed and upheld. Accordingly, the Section 2 – Section
5 gap probably will persist in the short term. But it need not endure indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
Everyone agrees that Shelby County inaugurated a new era in the South. As Heather
Gerken  commented  on  the  day  of  the  decision,  the  future  “will  look nothing like what existed at
9:59  this  morning,  before  the  Court  handed  down  its  opinion.”324 But until now there has been no
systematic effort to figure out what the new era actually will look like—what the state of
minority representation will be now that Section 5 has been struck down but Section 2 lives on.
In this Article, I have tried my hand at charting the contours of the unfamiliar legal and political
landscape in which we now find ourselves. The conclusions of my investigation are sobering if
not quite calamitous. Procedurally, Section 2 and Section 5 diverge in several major ways, all of
which mean that policies that formerly would have been blocked now will go into effect. With
respect to vote dilution, many districts that previously were protected now may (and probably
will) be dismantled without running afoul of Section 2. And with respect to vote denial, many
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franchise restrictions that used to be barred now may (and probably will) be enacted with legal
impunity.
To some, this new era may seem worse than the regime it replaced. But there do exist
measures that could largely restore the status quo ante. A new coverage formula could be
adopted, preclearance could be imposed on offending jurisdictions pursuant to a more flexible
bail-in provision, and Section 2 could be amended to mirror the stricken Section 5 more
faithfully. However, all of these steps face serious legal and political obstacles, at least for the
time being. A divided government is unlikely to pass legislation that may have uneven partisan
consequences. Likewise, the current Court probably would thwart any efforts to circumvent its
recent decision. Section Two minus Section Five thus may come to equal zero once again. But
odds are it will not do so for a while.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: DISTRICTS FORMERLY PROTECTED UNDER SECTION 5
State

Minority
CVAP %

Congress:
Total
Districts

Congress:
Section 5
Districts
1

State
Senate:
Total
Districts
35

State
Senate:
Section 5
Districts
8

State
House:
Total
Districts
105

State
House:
Section 5
Districts
28

Alabama

26.6%

7

Arizona

22.4%

9

2

30

6

60

10

Georgia

33.5%

14

4

56

16

180

57

Louisiana

32.9%

6

1

39

11

105

29

Mississippi

36.3%

4

1

52

15

122

42

North Carolina

24.0%

13

2

50

10

120

25

South Carolina

29.2%

7

1

46

11

124

32

Texas

38.7%

36

12

31

10

150

51

Virginia

23.0%

11

1

40

5

100

13

Total

31.1%

107

25

379

92

1066

287

Districts formerly protected under Section 5 either (1) have a combined minority CVAP above
50 percent or (2) have a combined minority CVAP above 40 percent and are represented by a
minority member.
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TABLE 2: HIGHLY NON-COMPACT ABILITY DISTRICTS
District

Dispersion

Regularity

AL Senate 18

0.14

0.13

GA Senate 39

0.14

0.11

GA House 55

0.15

0.12

GA House 57

0.14

0.12

GA House 83

0.14

0.12

GA House 84

0.13

0.09

LA Senate 29

0.12

0.04

LA House 21

0.11

0.05

NC Congress 1

0.29

0.04

NC Congress 12

0.07

0.03

NC Senate 21

0.34

0.05

NC House 7

0.28

0.04

NC House 12

0.12

0.05

NC House 48

0.23

0.04

SC House 109

0.11

0.11

SC House 113

0.12

0.13

TX Congress 15

0.15

0.12

TX Congress 33

0.23

0.05

TX Congress 35

0.10

0.05

TX House 131

0.14

0.15

TX House 145

0.13

0.11

VA House 95

0.14

0.14

List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with dispersion scores less than or
equal to 0.15 or regularity scores less than or equal to 0.05.
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TABLE 3: RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS
Variable

Composite Factor 1 (Socioeconomic Status)

Median Age
Married Household %

0.65

Nonfamily Household %

-0.50

High School Enrollment %
College Enrollment %
Median Household Income

0.54

Occupation – Professional %

0.41

Occupation – Sales %
Occupation – Construction %
Occupation – Manufacturing %
Owner-Occupied %

0.90

Renter-Occupied %

-0.90

Variance Explained

35.1%

Nine states (AL, AZ, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA) and 38,381 Census block groups
incorporated into analysis.
All variables apply to combined African American and Hispanic populations.
Single retained factor explains 35.1 percent of variance in data.
Only loadings greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 displayed.
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TABLE 4: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH HIGHLY SPATIALLY DIVERSE MINORITY POPULATIONS
District

Spatial Diversity

Minority Dispersion

AL Congress 7

0.83

0.59

AL Senate 18

0.88

0.33

AL Senate 19

0.81

0.49

AL Senate 26

0.90

0.81

AL House 19

0.89

0.51

AL House 52

0.86

0.39

AL House 53

0.99

0.50

AL House 54

0.98

0.25

AL House 55

0.78

0.24

AL House 60

0.98

0.27

AL House 76

0.83

0.47

AL House 77

1.01

0.40

AL House 78

0.88

0.27

AL House 83

0.80

0.57

AZ Congress 7

0.79

0.72

AZ Senate 3

0.82

0.61

AZ House 3

0.82

0.61

AZ House 3

0.82

0.61

GA Congress 2

0.80

0.63

GA Congress 4

0.91

0.60

GA Congress 5

0.86

0.58

GA Congress 13

0.79

0.30

GA Senate 2

0.83

0.87

GA Senate 5

0.89

0.39

GA Senate 15

0.84

0.63

GA Senate 22

0.89

0.78

GA Senate 26

0.80

0.53

GA Senate 34

0.90

0.41

GA Senate 38

0.86

0.43

GA Senate 39

0.88

0.19

GA Senate 41

1.01

0.33

GA Senate 43

0.80

0.61

GA House 55

0.87

0.14

GA House 61

0.88

0.19

GA House 62

0.83

0.14

GA House 63

0.82

0.12

GA House 64

0.83

0.21

GA House 66

0.87

0.51

59

GA House 74

0.85

0.38

GA House 84

0.92

0.11

GA House 86

0.85

0.25

GA House 87

0.92

0.23

GA House 88

1.13

0.20

GA House 91

0.84

0.39

GA House 100

0.79

0.72

GA House 132

0.85

0.57

GA House 136

0.88

0.37

GA House 142

0.85

0.70

GA House 153

0.87

0.53

GA House 162

0.82

0.32

GA House 163

0.82

0.36

LA Congress 2

0.87

0.59

LA Senate 3

0.79

0.20

LA Senate 4

0.86

0.46

LA Senate 7

1.04

0.49

LA Senate 15

0.92

0.52

LA House 4

0.90

0.32

LA House 34

0.78

0.80

LA House 61

0.79

0.52

LA House 87

0.83

0.37

LA House 97

0.84

0.44

LA House 99

0.80

0.35

LA House 100

0.92

0.88

LA House 101

1.01

0.47

LA House 102

0.98

0.34

MS Senate 26

0.86

0.21

MS Senate 29

0.97

0.23

MS House 45

0.81

0.29

MS House 55

0.91

0.73

MS House 57

0.86

0.37

MS House 66

0.85

0.28

MS House 69

0.81

0.25

MS House 71

0.80

0.40

MS House 72

0.96

0.22

NC Congress 12

0.87

0.51

NC Senate 14

0.97

0.69

NC Senate 20

0.95

0.44

NC Senate 21

0.79

0.54

NC Senate 28

0.88

0.74
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NC Senate 32

0.91

0.88

NC Senate 38

0.84

0.41

NC Senate 40

0.85

0.60

NC House 29

0.89

0.72

NC House 31

0.95

0.54

NC House 33

0.94

0.57

NC House 38

0.92

0.57

NC House 42

0.82

0.48

NC House 57

0.98

0.57

NC House 58

0.84

0.44

NC House 60

0.85

0.59

NC House 71

0.96

0.59

NC House 72

0.85

0.71

NC House 99

0.84

0.57

NC House 101

0.83

0.48

NC House 107

0.87

0.30

SC Senate 7

0.89

0.61

SC Senate 19

0.87

0.58

SC Senate 21

0.89

0.53

SC House 12

0.80

0.57

SC House 73

0.82

0.41

SC House 76

0.92

0.33

SC House 111

0.83

0.44

TX Congress 9

0.99

0.43

TX Congress 16

0.81

0.87

TX Congress 18

0.85

0.41

TX Congress 20

0.83

0.61

TX Congress 30

0.88

0.58

TX Congress 33

0.79

0.46

TX Congress 35

0.84

0.35

TX Senate 6

0.79

0.48

TX Senate 13

0.95

0.36

TX Senate 15

0.94

0.28

TX Senate 21

0.81

0.20

TX Senate 23

0.86

0.68

TX Senate 26

0.81

0.60

TX House 34

0.79

0.59

TX House 42

0.78

0.80

TX House 46

0.86

0.46

TX House 51

0.95

0.68

TX House 77

0.80

0.69
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TX House 95

0.84

0.43

TX House 100

0.82

0.30

TX House 101

1.01

0.40

TX House 103

0.85

0.39

TX House 111

1.00

0.33

TX House 116

0.85

0.30

TX House 120

0.80

0.65

TX House 123

0.81

0.34

TX House 131

0.93

0.16

TX House 139

0.85

0.28

TX House 141

0.92

0.28

TX House 142

0.79

0.24

TX House 145

0.82

0.20

TX House 146

0.89

0.26

TX House 147

0.86

0.24

VA Congress 3

0.85

0.59

VA Senate 2

0.84

0.49

VA Senate 5

0.91

0.49

VA Senate 9

0.95

0.29

VA Senate 16

0.82

0.50

VA Senate 18

0.86

0.25

VA House 70

0.98

0.33

VA House 74

0.85

0.14

VA House 77

0.98

0.24

VA House 80

0.89

0.46

VA House 95

0.85

0.35

List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with spatial diversity scores higher
than remedial district rejected in LULAC (0.78).
Spatial diversity scores computed with respect to composite factor 1 (socioeconomic status) from
factor analysis.
Spatial diversity  and  dispersion  scores  computed  for  districts’  minority  populations  only.
Districts with minority dispersion scores lower than remedial district rejected in LULAC (0.18)
shown in bold.
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TABLE 5: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH COMBINED MINORITY CVAPS BELOW 50 PERCENT
District

Black CVAP %

Hispanic CVAP %

AL House 85

46.7%

1.1%

Combined Minority
CVAP %
47.8%

AZ Senate 2

4.4%

42.3%

46.8%

AZ Senate 3

3.0%

44.7%

47.7%

AZ Senate 30

8.1%

33.9%

42.0%

AZ House 2

4.4%

42.3%

46.8%

AZ House 3

3.0%

44.7%

47.7%

AZ House 3

3.0%

44.7%

47.7%

AZ House 4

3.5%

46.2%

49.7%

GA House 38

40.0%

6.5%

46.5%

GA House 66

37.5%

2.8%

40.3%

GA House 132

42.9%

1.5%

44.3%

NC Senate 32

45.3%

4.2%

49.5%

SC Senate 7

46.2%

2.6%

48.8%

SC Senate 29

46.9%

0.7%

47.6%

SC House 90

43.4%

0.6%

44.0%

SC House 116

45.1%

1.3%

46.4%

VA House 52

31.0%

12.2%

43.2%

List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with combined minority CVAPs
below 50 percent.
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TABLE 6: FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS UNDER SECTION 2 AND SECTION 5 (1982 – PRESENT)
Policy

Section 2 Successful
Claims
3

Section 2 Failed Claims

Polling place eliminations

Section 5 Preclearance
Denials
19

Election date changes

15

0

0

Voter registration
procedures
Bilingual election
procedures
Voter roll purges

10

5

4

10

2

0

5

0

1

Lack of assistance to
voters
Photo ID laws

4

2

2

3

0

2

Absentee voting
procedures
Cutbacks to voting hours

3

2

4

2

1

1

Voting machine problems

1

3

2

Citizenship requirements
for registration
Total

1

0

0

73

18

19
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